Three essays on private landowners' response to incentives for carbon sequestration through forest management and afforestation by Langpap, Christian A. et al.
 
 
 
    
AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION OF 
 
Taeyoung Kim for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Applied Economics, presented 
on December 14, 2012. 
 
Title:  Three Essays on Private Landowners’ Response to Incentives for Carbon 
Sequestration through Forest Management and Afforestation 
 
Abstract approved: ____________________________________________________ 
Christian A. Langpap 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays on private landowners’ response to 
incentives for carbon sequestration in forests. The first essay examines private landowner 
response to incentives for carbon sequestration through various combinations of 
intermediate management practices. The second essay focuses on agricultural 
landowners’ willingness to participate in an incentive program for carbon sequestration 
through afforestation, and estimates the potential for carbon sequestration from 
afforestation, as well as its cost. The third study examines relative performances of 
incentive targeting strategies for forest carbon sequestration under asymmetric 
information given spatially heterogeneous land types.  
The first essay uses an econometric approach to analyze the factors affecting non-
industrial private forest landowners’ choice of forest management practices, and  
examines how these choices might change in response to the use of incentives for carbon 
sequestration. I use estimated parameters to simulate the carbon sequestration potential 
for different combinations of management practices, and compare the effectiveness and 
costs of performance-based and practice-based incentive payment schemes in the 
Western U.S. The results suggest that incentive payments can increase the probability 
that desirable combinations of management practices are adopted, and particularly that 
incentives targeting increased fertilization yield the highest carbon sequestration potential. 
I also find that a performance-based payment scheme produces higher carbon 
sequestration than a practice-based payments scheme. However, the annual sequestration 
potential of intermediate forest management in response to incentive payment is not as 
large as the sequestration potential of afforestation.  
 The second essay uses a survey-based stated preference approach to predict 
landowners’ willingness to participate in a tree planting program for carbon sequestration 
as a function of various factors affecting landowners’ decision making and different 
levels of incentive payments. The estimation results show that the annual payment for 
carbon sequestration significantly and positively affects landowners’ stated level of 
enrollment in a tree planting program. I use the estimated parameters to conduct regional 
level simulations of carbon sequestration in response to incentive payments. These 
simulations show that the carbon supply function in the Pacific Northwest region is 
steeper than in the Southeast region because of the lower adoption rate and less available 
lands. The national level carbon supply functions derived from this study are steeper than  
those obtained from bottom-up engineering approaches and optimization models, and are 
in the same range as those from revealed preference approach studies.  
The third essay uses both a conceptual analysis and a numerical analysis to 
examine the relative performances of incentive programs for carbon sequestration using 
alternative targeting criteria in the presence of asymmetric information and heterogeneity 
in costs and benefits. The results show that in the presence of asymmetric information, 
the combination of high cost-high benefit variability and negative correlation, which is 
the combination that achieves the greatest benefit gains under perfect information, can 
result in the greatest benefit losses. Additionally, a comparison of two targeting schemes 
shows that if cost variability is greater than benefit variability with negative correlation, 
the benefit achieved under benefit-cost ratio targeting can be lower than that under 
acreage targeting, so that an optimal targeting strategy under perfect information may no 
longer be optimal under asymmetric information.  
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Three Essays on Private Landowners’ Response to Incentives for Carbon Sequestration 
through Forest Management and Afforestation 
 
CHAPTER ONE  
 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
It has been widely recognized that forests can play an important role in contributing to 
greenhouse gas reductions through carbon sequestration. Especially, the potential role of 
nonindustrial private forests (NIPFs) in carbon sequestration is important since they 
comprise a significant portion of forests in the U.S. It is often suggested that providing 
incentives to private landowner is necessary to produce socially desirable environmental 
outcomes. There is evidence that providing incentives for landowners to sequester carbon 
in forests is a low-cost option relative to energy-based greenhouse gas mitigation 
approaches.  
However, the potential effect of an incentive program on forest carbon 
sequestration and its cost depend on various factors such as: i) management types 
(afforestation, reforestation, timber harvest decisions, and intermediate management 
activities), ii) incentive payment criteria (performance based scheme, practice based 
scheme), iii) spatial characteristics of carbon benefits and costs (distributions, variability, 
correlation), iv) information asymmetry between policy maker and individual landowner, 
and v) discount rates.  Additionally, the literature suggests that the estimated costs of 
carbon sequestration may vary with the methodological approach underlying the 2 
estimation (bottom up engineering approach, optimization, revealed preference, stated 
preference). The three essays in this dissertation examine private landowners’ responses 
to incentive payments for carbon sequestration in forests and simulate carbon 
sequestration potential and its cost by taking into account some of these factors which 
determine the effectiveness of an incentive program.  
The first essay (Chapter 2), Private Forest Landowners’ Response to Incentives 
for Carbon Sequestration in Forest Management, uses an econometric approach to 
predict landowners’ choices of intermediate forest management practices. There are 
several important features which distinguish this essay from other studies. First, the use 
of survey data of each individual landowner allows us to capture various factors affecting 
intermediate forest management decisions which are rarely taken into account in 
conventional econometric approaches using historical data. Second, the provided spatial 
characteristics of each forest site allow us to use the site-specific net returns as a main 
explanatory variable and to measure the site-specific carbon sequestration potential 
corresponding to the choice of management practices. This also allows us to use a 
performance-based scheme as an alternative contract criterion relative to a practice-based 
scheme. The results show that incentive payments can increase the probability of 
adopting the desirable combinations of management practices, and that an incentive 
targeting fertilization yields the highest carbon sequestration potential. The results also 
indicate that a performance-based payment scheme is more effective in promoting carbon 
sequestration than a practice-based payments scheme. However, simulation results 
suggest that the cost of carbon sequestration through intermediate forest management is 3 
higher than that through afforestation, because the annual carbon sequestration potential 
achieved by adopting intermediate management practice in response to incentive 
payments is not as large as the sequestration potential of afforestation.  
The second essay (Chapter 3), Agricultural Landowners’ Response to Incentives 
for Afforestation, uses a censored regression model to examine landowners’ willingness 
to participate in a tree planting program for carbon sequestration. The main advantage of 
this essay is the use of a stated preference approach based on a survey to examine the 
effects of various owner-specific characteristics affecting landowners’ afforestation 
decisions as an alternative to other approaches, such as a bottom-up engineering approach, 
an optimization approach, and revealed preference studies. One distinguishing 
characteristic of this study is that it uses a continuous measure of enrollment as opposed 
to a simple dichotomous measure of participation to elicit landowners’ willingness to 
enroll in a tree planting program. This allows landowners to choose a level of enrollment 
based on the different levels of payments offered by considering various heterogeneous 
factors they face. The estimation results suggest that the landowners’ stated level of 
enrollment in a tree planting program is significantly and positively affected by the 
annual payment for carbon sequestration.  The estimated parameters are used to conduct 
simulations of carbon sequestration in response to incentive payments to derive a carbon 
supply function for each region. The carbon supply function in the Pacific Northwest 
region is steeper than that in the Southeast region because of the lower adoption rate and 
less available lands despite of the higher carbon sequestration rate per acre. A comparison 
of carbon supply functions by scaling up from the regional level to the national level 4 
shows that the carbon supply functions derived from this study are steeper than those 
obtained from bottom-up engineering approaches and optimization models, and are 
within the range of those obtained from a revealed preference approach.   
The third essay (Chapter 4), Targeting Incentives for Carbon Sequestration with 
Spatially Heterogeneous Land Types under Asymmetric Information, uses a conceptual 
and numerical analysis to examine the relative performance of alternative targeting 
criteria for incentive payments in the presence of asymmetric information and 
heterogeneity in costs and benefits. The main contribution of this study is that it 
incorporates asymmetric information into choice of targeting strategies given spatially 
heterogeneous cost and benefit types. It therefore suggests how policy makers may 
choose the best targeting tool for a given level of budget in the presence of asymmetric 
information. The findings from this study show that the combination of high cost-high 
benefit variability and negative correlation, which achieves the greatest benefits under 
perfect information, can result in the greatest benefit losses in the presence of asymmetric 
information. This implies that an optimal targeting strategy under perfect information 
may no longer be optimal under asymmetric information, and thus may require higher 
monitoring efforts by the policy maker. However, if cost and benefit variability are low 
an optimal targeting strategy under perfect information is still optimal under asymmetric 
information, and thus it does not require highly accurate monitoring by the policy maker.  
Taken together, these three essays provide some insight into the potential 
effectiveness of different incentive programs, as well as a better understanding of other 
factors affecting landowners’ management and participation choices. 5 
CHAPTER TWO  
 
PRIVATE FOREST LANDOWERS’ RESPONSE TO INCENTIVES FOR 
CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN FOREST MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1. Introduction 
There is widespread recognition of the potential role forests can play in contributing to 
Greenhouse Gas reductions through carbon sequestration (Brand 1998, Metz et al. 2001, 
Lubowski et al. 2006, Gorte 2009). Nonindustrial private forests (NIPFs) comprise a 
significant portion of forests in the U.S.
1 Thus, it is crucial to assess the role that NIPF 
landowners can play in broader carbon sequestration efforts. NIPF ownership 
characteristics and management information, as well as their spatial characteristics, are 
essential for understanding NIPF owners’ forest management choices.  
Management actions by NIPF owners that could increase carbon sequestration on 
their lands include afforestation of land used for agriculture, reforestation, changing 
forest management such as increasing rotation length, fire control, fertilization, thinning 
and pruning, or choosing alternative tree species (Stainback and Alavalapati 2002, 
Sohngen and Mendelsohn 2003, Shaikh et al. 2007, Gorte 2009). It is generally known 
that providing incentives for landowners to sequester carbon in forests is a comparatively 
low-cost option relative to energy-based GHG mitigation approaches (Alig, R. J. 2003, 
Lubowski et al. 2006, Mason and Plantinga 2011). However, existing studies on 
                                                 
 
1 According to Smith et al. (2009) 423 million acres (56%) out of 751 million acres of forest land in the U.S. 
is owned by private entities such as private individuals, corporations, and other private groups in 2007. 6 
landowners’ response to carbon sequestration incentives have largely focused on 
afforestation and reforestation (Adams et al. 1993, Alig et al. 1997, Parks and Hardie 
1995, Plantinga et al. 1999, Stavins 1999, Newell and Stavins 2000, Lubowski et al. 
2006). 
Changing management practices (MPs) in existing forests has been often 
mentioned as a source of carbon sequestration as well. Many studies have shown the 
potential for forest carbon sequestration by adopting a certain forest management 
practices. For example, Row (1996) concluded that change in forest management can 
increase carbon sequestration by 0.6-0.8 metric tons (Mt) of carbon per acre per year in 
the cases of loblolly pines in Southeast and Douglas Fir in the Pacific Northwest.
2 IPCC 
(2000) shows that forest management activities such as regeneration, fertilization, choice 
of species and reduced forest degradation have the potential to sequester around 0.2 Mt 
per acre per year in developed countries. Intermediate forest MPs which is conducted to 
increase tree growth rate or enhance resistance from hazard can be a source of carbon 
sequestration as well.
3 Grayston (2006) concluded that nitrogen fertilization can increase 
aboveground biomass, and thus increases soil carbon, based on review of various papers 
published since 1978.
4 Shafii et al. (1989) showed that 200 lb of urea nitrogen application 
                                                 
 
2 Carbon in wood products is also included.  
3 Intermediate management practices are silvicultural treatments which are conducted to improve timber 
productivity, and enhance resistances from potential hazards such as fire and diseases during the stands 
are growing. Intermediate management involves the practices that improve the site quality such as 
fertilization, thinning, and fuel treatment, or manage pests and insects (IPCC 2000, North et al. 2009, 
McKinley et al. 2011). 
4 Grayston (2006) mentioned that fertilization can be a source of N2O and CH4 emissions, however in 
contrast to agriculture fertilization have limited effects on them. Pang and Cho (1984) showed nitrogen 7 
on stands of Grand fir and Douglas-fir in Idaho results in significant growth of average 
basal area and height over a 6-year post-treatment period, and increases average tree size 
by 14% in unthinned stands over a 14-year treatment period, which leads additional 
carbon sequestration. Miller and Fight (1979) and Miller et al. (1989) mentioned nitrogen 
fertilization on Douglas-firs in western Washington and Oregon increases growth in 
diameter and volume. In the case of activities controlling fire hazard, North et al. (2009) 
concluded that thinning and prescribed burning allow greater long-term storage of carbon 
since they yield bigger and more fire-resistant trees and decrease the intensity of future 
wildfires, although they decrease total carbon storage in the short run. On the other hand, 
McKinley et al. (2011) argued that while thinning is an effective forest management 
technique used to reduce fire risk, increase tree resistance to insect and disease, and 
increases the growth of the remaining trees, since overall tree stock is reduced because of 
thinning, the carbon stock in a thinned stand is generally lower than that in an unthinned 
stand.
5  Law and Harmon (2011) also argued that large amount (40–50%) of above-
ground biomass need to be reduced to achieve a significant level of fire severity 
reduction.  This would lead a net emission of forest carbon if the amount of carbon 
removed is greater than that saved by reducing fire severity. Although these studies have 
shown the potential of carbon sequestration by changing forest MPs, the MP changes 
introduced in these studies are not correspond to landowners’ responses with respect to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
fertilization can be a negligible source of N2O emissions from forest soils. Van Miegroet and Jandl (2007) 
showed the effect of nitrogen fertilization on the aboveground biomass is large enough to offset the 
possibility of soil carbon loss.  
5 This is because even 100% use of the harvested trees for products or biomass energy may not produce a 
total carbon benefit greater than that of the higher storage and storage rate in an unthinned stand. 8 
various factors such as annual net returns, and individual characteristics affecting their 
MP decisions. Thus, it is hard to know what factors affect landowners’ MP choices and 
how much the cost of carbon sequestration is by adopting a certain MP.  
There are several studies which examine landowners’ forest MP decisions and 
carbon sequestration potentials in economic perspectives. For example, Plantinga and 
Birdsey (1993) developed a carbon budget model to examine the effects of forest MPs, 
harvesting in particular, on carbon sequestration in private forests. Englin and Callaway 
(1993) showed that the optimal rotation age of Douglas-fir with payment for carbon 
sequestration is positively correlated with the price of carbon. Van Kooten et al. (1995) 
examined the implications of carbon subsidies and taxes for economically optimal 
harvest decisions and found that rotation ages would increase by roughly 20 percent over 
the level where no carbon costs or benefits are considered. Sohngen and Brown (2008) 
showed that around 15 million tons of CO2 could be sequestered at less than $7/ton CO2 
(209 million tons CO2 at $55/ton CO2) of carbon price by extending rotation ages in 
softwood forests in 12 states of the southern and western U.S.  Zyrina (2001) estimated 
the cost of carbon sequestration with different MP regimes, and showed the carbon 
storage increases from 428 Mt/ha to 589 Mt/ha with a marginal cost of $13.28/Mt, 
and from 683 Mt/ha to 802.7 Mt/ha with a marginal cost of $32.79/Mt. These studies 
suggest that incentive programs including taxes or carbon payments or other types of 
subsidies can impact the management decisions of forest in ways that can lead to 
increased carbon sequestration. However, most of them have focused on rotation length 
and harvest decision, and few have focused on other silvicultural management activities 9 
such as fertilization and thinning. In addition, one important drawback of these studies is 
that most of them have analyzed the carbon sequestration effects of the forest 
management activities independently, while in practice these activities may be conducted 
jointly rather than independently within certain range of forestland. 
One important advantage of this study is the use of survey data which describe the 
NIPF landowners’ management practice choices, and their demographic characteristics, 
resource characteristics, and other attributes which can affect landowners’ decision of 
management practices.
6  The survey-based approach can capture various factors affecting 
forest management decisions which are rarely taken into account in conventional 
econometric approaches using historical data. 
The main purpose of this study is to examine private landowner response to 
incentives for carbon sequestration through combinations of intermediate MPs of existing 
forests, and to measure the carbon sequestration potential of these forest management 
combinations given different levels of incentive payments.  
The study results show that the factors affecting the probabilities of adopting 
intermediate MPs of forests differ by the choice of MPs. The own marginal effects and 
elasticities of the probabilities of choosing the MPs with respect to expected net returns 
are all positive and significantly different from zero, which is consistent with 
expectations of economic theory. Landowners’ demographic characteristics do not 
                                                 
 
6 There are survey-based studies have shown how landowner attributes and incentives shape forest 
management decisions for other environment services such as biodiversity and endangered species (e.g. 
Nagubadi et al. 1996, Conway et al. 2003, Langpap 2004, 2006), but not for carbon sequestration 
especially through intermediate forest managements. 10 
significantly affect the probability of choosing a certain MP, while the spatial 
characteristics, objectives of owning forestlands, and concerns they have faced tend to 
affect these probabilities significantly.  The calculated carbon sequestration trends of four 
different MPs show that the choice of ‘Fertilization’ or ‘No Activity’ can sequester more 
carbon than the choice including ‘Fuel Treatment’, which suggests that the fact that 
activities enhancing resistance from fire, quality of remaining trees, and biodiversity, do 
not always increase the carbon sequestration potentials. The simulation of carbon 
sequestration potentials in response to incentive payments with different targeting 
strategies shows that targeting the choice of ‘fertilization’ yields the highest carbon 
sequestration potential, and a performance-based payment scheme produces higher 
carbon sequestration than a practice-based payments scheme. However, the comparison 
of the supply function of carbon sequestration with afforestation studies shows that the 
annual carbon sequestration potential through changing intermediate MPs of NIPFs in the 
western U.S. is not as large as that through afforestation.      
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
conceptual background and model specification, the data description, and the analysis of 
the econometric model. Section 3 presents baseline carbon sequestration potentials, the 
incentive payment design, and the simulation of carbon sequestration potentials with 
different incentive payments strategies.  Section 4 includes a discussion of the main 
findings and the conclusion.    
    11 
2.2. Econometric Analysis 
2.2.1. Conceptual Background and Model Specification 
In this section, I describe the conceptual background of NIPF landowner’s forest 
management decision models and the econometric model. A utility maximization 
framework is the starting point to evaluate NIPF landowners’ forest management activity 
choices (Pattanayak et al. 2002).  
Consider a utility-maximizing NIPF landowner who is faced with various 
combinations of forest management practices. Since forest management activities can be 
conducted jointly within the same area of forestland, suppose the NIPF landowner can 
choose among K different combinations of forest MPs, with k = 0 indicating no forest 
MPs and k = 1,2,…,K indicating the set of mutually exclusive combinations of forest 
MPs. The NIPF owner maximizes expected utility from managing forestlands by 
adopting a combination of MPs: combination k (k=1,2,...,K) will be chosen if Uk>Uj for 
all k≠j, where Uk is the utility of adopting combination k.  
Since the landowner’ utility can be affected by both observable and unobservable 
components, the landowner’s MPs decision problem can be modeled using a general 
random utility (RUM) approach (Lubowski et al. 2002; Cooper 2003). Let Uik(Zik) be the 
expected utility of NIPF landowner i from choosing a combination of MPs k on her 
forestland. The utility depends on vector of variables Zik = [Xik, Wi], where Xik is a vector 
of attributes of forest management choices such as expected net returns, which varies 
across the forest management choices and across the individual landowners. Wi is a 
vector of individual landowners’ characteristics and their land characteristics which 12 
varies only over the landowners (Greene 2008, Lubowski 2002). By considering both 
observable and unobservable components of NIPF landowners’ management decision, 
Uik(Zik) can be considered a random variable and be written as:   
' ( ) ,  0,1,2,..., ik ik ik k ik U Z Z k K     .      (1) 
where  k   are parameters for each variable and  ik  is a random error term. The probability 
that NIPF owner i will choose the forest MPs combination k is:  
'' Pr( ) Pr( ) Pr( ),  i ik ij ik k ik ij j ij y k U U Z Z k j                  (2) 
If we assume the error term  ik   is independently and identically distributed with 
the extreme value distribution, then the probability that NIPF owner i will adopt 
intermediate forest MP choice k can be specified using a multinomial Logit model 
(McFadden 1974; Maddala 1993). The MNL model for the choice of intermediate forest 
MPs can be written as 
'
'
0
Pr ,  0,1,2,..., .
ik k
ij j
Z
ik K
Z
j
e
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e



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
        (3)
   
Then, the log-likelihood function is: 
  log log
NK
ik ik
ik
L d P             (4) 
where dik = 1 if individual i chooses alternative j and dik = 0 otherwise. 
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2.2.2. Data description  
We rely on data from National Woodland Owner Survey (NWOS),
7 which describes 
private woodland owners’ forest management behaviors, landowners’ attributes, and land 
characteristics conducted by the U.S. Forest Service from 2002 to 2006, to analyze the 
factors affecting landowners’ forest management decision. There are a total of 593 
observations which cover the Western United States (AZ, CO, CA, ID, MT, NM, OR, 
UT, WA, and WY).  Of these, 513 observations are defined as NIPFs owners. The spatial 
location of plots of individual forestlands is also provided,
8 which allows us to 
incorporate the stand information of each forestland from the Forest Inventory and 
Analysis (FIA) constructed by the USDA Forest Service.   
The forest management activities included in the NWOS data are: i) Partial 
harvest to improve the growth of remaining trees (Thinning), ii) Fire hazard reduction, 
and iii) Fertilization.  Since most landowners who adopt thinning for remaining trees also 
conduct fire hazard reduction to improve fire tolerance, and thinning is commonly 
considered as a type of activity to control fire hazard, we combined thinning and fire 
hazard control together as one type of intermediate forest MP, fuel treatment. Thus, the 
                                                 
 
7 The National Woodland Owner Survey (NWOS) is the official census of forest owners in the United 
States. It is aimed at increasing understanding of woodland owners who are the critical link between 
forests and society (USDA Forest Service 2012). 
8 The NWOS sample locations are corresponding to plot center of the FIA inventory plots (Butler et al. 
2005). However, because FIA has a policy of nondisclosure of exact locations of observations due to the 
confidentiality issues, a certain percentage of plots, which is randomly chosen, is fuzzed within a buffer 
area of 0.5 to 1 miles around each plot, and swapped with similar plots in the same county to protect 
landowner privacy (LaPoint 2005). Nevertheless, McRoberts et al. (2005) concluded that if the study area 
is large enough, the effect of perturbing and swapping on analyses using FIA data is negligible. 14 
choices of intermediate forest MPs are: Fertilization–Fuel Treatment (FFT), Fertilization 
only (F), Fuel Treatment only (FT), and No activities (NA).  
We calculate the owner-specific expected net returns with different choice of 
intermediate forest MPs as one of key explanatory variables to examine the NIPF 
owners’ responses. As a measure of annual net returns, we use the annualized value of 
Land and Timber Stands (LTV) (Latta and Montgomery 2004).  Because of the lack of 
identifiable information of each landowner’s harvested and replanted trees, we assume all 
NIPFs landowners plant and harvest their trees. The LTV for each MP choice k and 
landowner i, based on the current stand volume is:   
0
0
0
( )(1 )
,  s.t. 
(1 )
T
Tt
ikt ikt ikt ik
tt
ik Tt
P Q C r SEV
LTV T t
r




  
  


        (5) 
where T is the final harvest year, t
0is the current year, Pikt is stumpage price for i and k at 
year t, Qikt is the per acre harvest volume for i and k at year t, Cikt is the per acre cost of 
stand treatments applied for i and k at year t, ω is a maximum range of time horizon, r is 
the annual discount rate, and SEVik is the value of bare land for i and k, which we assume 
to be the present value of timber production.
9 
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We then annualized the LTV using a 5% discount rate over a 100-year period.
10  
Owner-specific management costs (Cikt) for fuel treatment are calculated by using the fuel 
reduction cost simulator (FRCS), which estimates the cost of fuel reduction activities by 
considering stand volumes and each forestland’s spatial characteristics, such as distance 
to the closest main road, average slope, and elevation (Fight et al. 2006). We rely on 
previous studies to provide a range of fertilization costs (Shumway and Atkinson 1978, 
Miller and Fight 1979, Zyrina 2001). We then normalize the cost based on application 
time and amount, and differentiate between parcels based on average slope and distance 
from main road. The site specific stand volume (Qikt) with various management 
combinations is calculated using the Forest Vegetation Simulator (FVS).
11,12 Location 
information (Longitude and Latitude) of each forestland plot allow us to incorporate 
forest inventory data (e.g. tree species, stand age, slope, elevation, etc) which is necessary 
to run FVS.   
                                                 
 
10 We followed the rule of normalization done by Stavins and Richard (2005) to our result be comparable to 
other study results.  
11 The Forest Vegetation Simulator (FVS) is an individual tree growth model widely used in the U.S. to 
support decision making on various forest management issues such as silvicultural prescriptions, fuels 
treatment, insect and disease impacts, and wildlife habitat management. The spatial scale of the FVS can 
vary from a single stand to thousands of stands. The stand growth simulation models can differ depending 
on the geographic region by applying regionally specific model variants (Crookston and Dixon 2005). 
The FVS is a very flexible carbon accounting tool, since it can consider the spatial heterogeneity of each 
forest parcel and can be applied with various silvicultural forest management activities. 
12 To simulate tree growth with different management options using FVS, we need to define a general 
silvicultural treatment rule for each management practice. In the case of fuel treatment, we followed the 
U.S. Forest Service guide to fuel treatment in the western U.S. (Johnson et al. 2007). We apply four 
silvicultural options (thinning from below to 50 trees per acre (tpa), 100 tpa, 200 tpa, and 300 tpa with 18 
bdh limit with surface fuel removal) to calculate trends of stand volume and carbon sequestration 
potential. In the case of fertilization, we use application of 200 pounds of nitrogen per acre, since the FVS 
supports only this option. 16 
We categorized the owner-specific variables used in the econometric model as 
follows: Landowner’s demographic characteristics, resource and spatial characteristics, 
and landowner’s attributes. At first, landowner’s demographic characteristics which are 
taken from NWOS include age, level of education, level of household income, and 
occupation. Several studies have shown that age has a positive correlation with adoption 
of soil conservation practices (Ervin and Ervin 1982), while it has a negative correlation 
on harvesting and investment on silvicultural activities (Beach et al. 2005).  However, 
some studies argued that age does not significantly affect timber harvest behavior and the 
forestry cost share program (Dennis 1989, Nagubadi et al. 1996).  It is also argued that 
income is negatively correlated with timber harvest (Dennis 1989, 1990, Beach et al. 
2005), and positively correlated with silvicultural management activities (Beach et al. 
2005). But several studies found that both income and education do not significantly 
affect forest owners’ management decision (Dennis 1989, Langpap 2006). The 
landowners whose occupation is farm or forest related are positively and significantly 
correlated with timber harvest (Beach et al. 2005). 
   Regarding the resource characteristics, it is known that site quality and stand 
volume increase the amount of silvicultural activities (Zhang and Pearse, 1996) and 
harvests (Dennis 1990), while size of forestland has a positive effect on silvicultural 
activities in around 40% of the studies cited in Beach et al. (2005).  It is also generally 
recognized that greater stand volume, larger plot size, flatter average slope (below 35-40 
degree), higher incidence of mills close to the site, and shorter distance from the site to a 
main road, all reduce forest management costs, which may induce more intermediate 17 
MPs or harvesting (Cubbage 2004, Latta and Montgomery 2004, Fight et al. 2006, Zhou 
and Kockelmen 2008). Based on this information, resource characteristics taken from 
NWOS include size of forestlands owned within a state, forest regions (Pacific 
Northwest, Pacific Southwest, and Northern Rocky Mountain). Additionally, we create 
individual land’s spatial characteristic variables by overlapping the location information 
(Longitude and Latitude) of each forestland with other spatial data from Forest Inventory 
Analysis (FIA) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), which include stand density 
index (SDI), slope dummy (below 35 degree or not), distance from site to main road, and 
number of mills within 50 miles from the site.  
Finally, landowners’ attributes taken from NWOS include: objectives of owning 
forestland, concerns faced recently (concerns about future development, air quality, 
insects and disease, and risk of fire), whether a landowner is living within a mile of 
forestland or not, whether a landowner is a main decision maker of management or not, 
program enrollment or knowledge (cost-share program, and knowledge about green 
certification), whether a landowner recently harvested non-timber products or not, and 
land acquisition method.  Landowners who own forests for commercial purposes are 
more likely to invest in silvicultural MPs such as thinning to improve quality of timber; 
hence they may be less likely to participate in the program to prevent such activities. On 
the other hand, we expect that landowners who own forests for privacy or recreational 
opportunities may be less likely to invest in timber harvest or silvicultural MPs. Some 
studies mentioned that development pressure can affect land use choice (Mansfield et al. 
2000, Kristensen et al. 2001), but it is unclear how landowners who are concerned about 18 
future development act for their forests. We expect that landowners who are under 
pressure of development might invest more to increase their property value, but are less 
willing to participate in the program to provide environmental services. Many studies 
mentioned that landowners who are under pressure of fire risk, insect, and disease tend to 
harvest earlier and invest more for intermediate MPs such as fuel treatment and risk 
control practice by thinning (Reed 1984, Gregory et al. 2003, Nebeker et al. 2005, 
Konoshima et al. 2008).  We also expect that if landowners who live within a mile of 
their forests, and if the main decision makers are in forest-related professions such as 
logging contractor and forester, they are more likely to conduct forest management 
practices. Program enrollment such as cost sharing and technical assistance has positive 
effects on encouraging silvicultural treatment (Beach et al. 2005). In this study, the 
participation dummy of cost sharing program and knowledge about green certification are 
available to use from NWOS for econometric analysis. Table 2.1 presents the 
descriptions and summary statistics of all of these variables.   
2.2.3. Model Estimates and Interpretation 
We specify the component of individual landowner i’s utility of MP choice k as follows:   
1 2 3 ,  , , , ik k k ik k ik k ik k ik ik U AnnLTV OWN LC OA k FFT F FT NA              . (6) 
where  ik AnnLTV  is a vector of annual LTVs, OWNik is a vector of landowners’ 
demographic characteristics, LCik is a vector of forestland characteristics, OAik is a vector 
of landowners’ attributes, and  ik  is a random error term, for landowner i and MP choice 
k. 19 
The estimated parameters allow us to analyze the determinants of NIPFs owners’ 
choices of management practice combinations.  Since the interpretation of coefficients in 
a multinomial logit model is difficult, the marginal effects
13 are used to examine what 
determinants affect NIPFs owners’ choices of MPs. Table 2.2 shows the marginal effects 
of the explanatory variables, calculated using the model coefficients and the sample 
means of the variables. The main variables of interest are annual LTVs (AnnLTV1~4) of 
forest MPs as proxies of expected net returns. The own marginal effects with respect to 
LTVs are all positive and significant at least at the 10% significance level, which implies 
that an increase in the LTV for a forest MP will increase the likelihood that the forest MP 
will be chosen.  The cross marginal effects with respect to annual LTVs have mostly 
negative signs, although not all are significant. For example, a higher annual LTV for the 
choice ‘FFT (Fertilization-Fuel Treatment)’ decreases the probability of choosing choice 
‘F (Fertilization) and ‘FT (Fuel Treatment)’.  The cross marginal effects of annual LTV 
in choice ‘F’ are negative, but not significant. The higher annual LTV for the choice ‘FT’ 
decreases the probability of choosing other MPs significantly.  
In cases of marginal effects with respect to landowners’ demographic 
characteristics, age (Age) and household income dummy (Income) do not significantly 
affect the probability of choosing MPs. Education dummies (Education) do not 
significantly affect the choice of MPs as well, except that landowners with $50,000 to 
                                                 
 
13 Average marginal effects are calculated using the following formula:
  Pr Pr Pr
j j j
ik ik ik k ik k k z            , where 
j
ik z and 
j
k  are the jth elements of vectors  ik z and  k  , 
respectively.   20 
$100,000 of household income (Income2) are less likely to choose ‘FT’. The landowners 
whose occupation is related to farm or forests (Occupation_farm) are more likely to 
adopt ‘FT’, which is consistent with other studies showing that it is positively and 
significantly correlated with timber harvest (Beach et al. 2005). While each of the 
landowners’ demographic characteristics does not significantly affect the probability of 
choosing a certain MP, the test for the joint significance of each equation rejects the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients associated with landowners’ demographic characteristics 
are zero at the 10% significant level.  
In cases of marginal effects on the probability of choosing ‘FFT (Fertilization and 
Fuel Treatement)’ with respect to resource characteristics and landowners’ attributes, 
results suggest that the probability of choosing ‘FFT’ increase with higher in-stand 
density index (SDI), which is consistent with previous studies mentioned in Beach et al. 
(2005).
14 It has positive effects on the probability of choosing ‘FFT’ with landowners 
who own their forests for recreation (Obj_recreation), who have concerns about future 
development (Concern_develop), and who have enrolled in a cost share program 
(Costshare), while it has negative effects for those landowners who have concerns about 
privacy (Concern_privacy).    
The marginal effects on probability of choosing ‘F (Fertilization)’ with respect to 
resource characteristics and landowners’ attributes indicate that landowners who live 
within a mile of their forests (Primary_resident), distance from site to main road 
                                                 
 
14 Stand density index (SDI) is a measure of stocking of tree stands based on the number of trees per unit 
area and diameter at breast height (DBH) of stand trees of average basal area (Avery and Hurkhart 2002). 21 
(Distance_S2R), landowners who have concerns about insects and diseases 
(Concern_disease), and who produce non-timber food products recently (NTFP_recent) 
have positive effects on the possibility of choosing ‘F’, while landowners who owns their 
forests for biodiversity (Obj_biodiversity), who have concerns about future development 
(Concern_develop), and who have concerns about fire hazard (Concern_fire) are less 
likely to choose ‘F’.  
The marginal effects on probability of choosing between ‘FT (Fuel Treatment)’ 
and ‘NA (No Activity)’ have opposite signs in most cases. Those landowners with forest 
lands located in the northern rocky mountain (NRMT) region are more likely to adopt 
‘FT’, but less likely to choose ‘NA’. The marginal effect of distance from the site to a 
main road (Distance_S2R) shows that the further away from a main road a site is, the less 
likely a landowner is to ‘FT’, and more likely to choose ‘NA’.  The landowners who live 
within a mile of their forestlands (Primary_resident), who are consulted by non-family 
experts (Manager; e.g. logging contractor, forester, and business partner), who own lands 
for biodiversity (Obj_biodiversity) and timber harvest (Obj_timber), and are concerned 
about risk of fire (Concern_fire) are more likely to choose ‘FT’, but less likely to choose 
‘NA’.
15 On the other hand, those landowners who own forests for recreation 
(Obj_recreation) and privacy (Obj_privacy) are less likely to choose ‘FT’, but more 
likely to choose ‘NA’.  In addition, the landowners who have knowledge about green 
                                                 
 
15 It is generally known that thinning for fuel treatment can enhance the fire resistance of remaining trees 
(North et al 2009, McKinley et al. 2010). And Muir et al. (2002) mentioned that thinning on young 
forests may increase vegetative structure for a variety of plant and wildlife species, and also concluded 
the total abundance of birds is greater in thinned young- and old-growth stands than in un-thinned stands.  22 
certification, and who produce non-timber food products are less likely to choose ‘NA’. 
These results are consistent with our expectations and the results of previous studies 
(Mansfield et al. 2000, Kristensen et al. 2001, Gregory et al. 2005, Nebeker et al. 2005, 
Beach et al. 2005, Konoshima et al. 2008) mentioned in the previous section. One 
interesting result is that enrollment into a cost share program affects ‘FFT’ and ‘FT’ in 
opposite directions, even if both conduct fuel treatment. However, since the purposes and 
types of cost sharing program that each landowner is enrolled in are unknown, it is 
difficult to explain why this is. 
To get a better idea of the magnitude of these effects, in Table 2.3 we calculate 
the own- and cross-return semi-elasticities of the probability of choosing the different MP 
combinations with respect to annual LTVs. The semi-elasticities are calculated as the 
percentage point change in the probability of adopting a certain combination for a 1% 
change in the net returns for each choice. For example, the own semi-elasticities of 
annual LTVs show that a 1% increase in LTV of each MP choice increases the 
probability of adopting the MP choices ‘FFT’, ‘F’, ‘FT’, and ‘NA’ by 0.20 percentage 
point (%p), 0.28 %p, 0.7 %p, and 0.41 %p, respectively. The cross-return semi-
elasticities show that a 1% increase in annual LTV of choice ‘FFT’ reduces the 
possibility of choosing ‘F’ by 0.14 %p, and ‘FT’ by 0.22 %p. However, a 1% increase in 
annual LTV of choice ‘F’ or ‘NA’ does not significantly affect the probability of 
adopting other MPs, while a 1% increase in annual LTV of choice ‘FT’ reduces the 
probability of adopting the choice ‘FFT’ by 0.15 %p, and ‘NA’ by 0.52 %p.  23 
We use the predicted probabilities to predict the choice of a landowner’s forest 
MP, so the choice of MP with the highest predicted probability is the predicted choice. 
This will allow us to calculate the baseline carbon sequestration potentials. Based on the 
predicted choices, 5.8% of landowners choose ‘FFT’, 3.7% choose ‘F’, 38.4% choose 
‘FT’, and 52.0% choose ‘NA’. Since each landowner owns forestland of different size, I 
also calculate predicted probabilities of MP choices weighted by acreage: 14.1% of forest 
acres are managed with ‘FFT’, 3.1% with ‘F’, 49.6% with ‘FT’, and 33.1% with ‘NA’.
16 
The model correctly predicts landowners’ MPs choice at 70% and 91% of actual choices 
are predicted as the first or second choice by the models.  We also used Theil’s Inequality 
Coefficient to validate the model further by comparing actual choices and predicted 
choices (Leuthold 1975, Ahn et al. 2000, Langpap and Wu 2008). The coefficient is 0.12 
which indicates a good predictive performance.
17 
 
2.3. Simulation of Carbon Sequestration with Incentives  
2.3.1. Calculation of carbon sequestration trend and baseline  
We use the estimates from the econometric model and the FVS to simulate carbon 
accumulation trends for the different management options. Specifically, for each 
management option (NA, F, FT, and FFT) we assume that all landowners choose only 
                                                 
 
16 Actual probabilities of MP choices weighted by acreage were 12.1% with ‘FFT’, 3.9% with ‘F’, 48.2% 
with ‘FT’, and 35.8% with ‘NA’.   
17 Theil’s Inequality Coefficient is a measure of forecasting accuracy, which ranges between 0 and 1 with a 
value of 0 indicating a perfect prediction (Leuthold, 1975). The coefficients in Langpap and Wu (2008) 
range between 0.007 and 0.17 in projection of different land use categories.  24 
that option
18, and that trees are allowed to grow without harvest for 100 years
19. The 
results, shown in Figure 2.1, indicate the carbon sequestration potential, over a hundred 
year period, of each individual management option. The carbon accumulation trends 
show that fertilization (‘F’) has the highest carbon sequestration potential, followed by no 
management activities (‘NA’). Note that the carbon sequestration potential of ‘NA’ is 
always greater than that of fuel treatment (‘FT’) and of fertilization and fuel treatment 
combined (‘FFT’). This implies that removing some portion of trees by thinning to 
enhance the quality of remaining trees and fire resistance does not provide higher total 
carbon benefits than the choice of no thinning. This result is consistent with McKinley et 
al. (2011) and Law and Harmon (2011).
20  
Given the carbon sequestration trend of each management choice, we calculate 
the baseline carbon sequestration trend per acre, which is the average of annual carbon 
accumulation of the different management practices weighted by the corresponding 
predicted probabilities of management choices (i.e. 14.1% of forest acres are managed 
                                                 
 
18 The carbon accumulation trend for ‘FFT’ is calculated by combining management rules from ‘FT’ and 
‘F’. 
19 We only considered NIPF lands that are stocked with more than 50 trees per acre. Harvested or un-
stocked lands were excluded. Since the data on landowners’ management choices correspond to the years 
2002 - 2006, our simulation is calibrated to begin in 2006. We use the Carbon Report in the Fire and 
Fuel Extension of Forest Vegetation Simulator (FFE–FVS) (Hoover and Rebain, 2011), which accounts 
for carbon in above ground live trees, below ground live trees, below ground dead trees, standing dead 
trees, down dead wood, the forest floor, the understory, wood products in use, products in landfills, and 
carbon emitted from combustion. Carbon accumulation trends of each MP choice are calculated by 
assuming 100% of landowners choose one specific MP. 
20 We expect that the cost of carbon sequestration with consideration of fire risk can be higher than that we 
estimated, because the difference in carbon sequestration between thinned (‘FFT’ and ‘FT’) and 
unthinned ( ‘F’ and ‘NA’) stands may be lower, and hence the carbon sequestration potential of  
converting practices may be smaller. Law and Harmon (2011) mentioned even if the risk of fire is 
considered, the carbon sequestration potential with fuel treatment is lower than with the no activity 
option. This implies that the amount of carbon loss caused by fuel treatment is larger than carbon 
sequestration induced by reducing the possibility of fire. 25 
with ‘FFT’, 3.1% with ‘F’, 49.6% with ‘FT’, and 33.1% with ‘NA’).
21 We assume that 
the predicted proportion of MPs will not change over time, if other conditions facing 
landowners remain the same over time.    
2.3.2. Incentive payments design 
The goal of the incentive payments program is to increase carbon sequestration by 
encouraging the NIPF owners to switch their current intermediate MP to alternative MPs. 
The simulation of carbon sequestration examines how the adoption rate of each MPs will 
change with incentive payments and measures how much carbon can be additionally 
sequestered with this change in adoption rate. I assume incentives are paid to NIPF 
owners to encourage implementation of forest MPs which can increase carbon 
sequestration. The effects of incentive payments to encourage a certain forest MP for 
carbon sequestration are simulated by changing the level of annual LTV of that particular 
MP choice given different level of payments. An incentive payment to adopt forest MP 
choice k increases the annual LTV of that MP, and therefore modifies the estimated 
adoption probabilities Pk as follows (Lubowski et al. 2006):  
ˆ ( , , , , , ) ik k ik ik ij i i i P f AnnLTV AnnPAY AnnLTV OWN LC OA        (7) 
where AnnLTVik is the annual payment per acre for carbon sequestration. We then 
calculate the impact of the incentive on carbon sequestration based on the net increment 
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carbon stored per acre for the MP k with the highest predicted probability, and Acreagei is acreage of 
forestlands owned by each individual landowner i. 26 
in the adoption rate of a given management practice relative to the baseline.   
We assume that the landowner and an agency providing the incentive enter into a 
contract specifying the agreed-upon activity and the amount of the payment.
22 The 
duration of the contract is ten years (we check the robustness of our results to alternative 
contract lengths in section 2.3.6).
23 The incentive payments we use in the simulations 
range from $0 to $150 per acre for the duration of contract, rising in $10 increments.
24 
When measuring the additional sequestration induced by the incentive payment, we only 
consider the amount of carbon sequestered within the duration of the contract.
25 We 
annualize the amount of carbon sequestration over a hundred year time horizon using a 
5% rate.   
  An important aspect of an incentive contract is the payment criterion. We 
consider two criteria: i) a practice-based contract in which the goal of incentive payments 
is to change the management practice itself, and ii) a performance-based contract in 
which the goal is to change the environmental benefits, i.e. the amount of carbon 
                                                 
 
22 We assume that no harvesting is allowed during the length of the contract to ensure there is enough time 
for sequestration to take place. This is necessary because there is a time lag between switching 
management practices and achieving a given level of sequestration. 
23 The contract length of federal conservation payment programs is 10-15 years for the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP), 5-10 years for the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP), and 6 years for 
the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) (USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service 
2008).   
24 It is difficult to choose the appropriate range of incentive payment since there are no comparable 
examples from previous studies of intermediate forest management choices. Therefore, we chose the 
range of incentive payments based on the average range of maximum carbon price from U.S. EPA (2005) 
and the U.S. Agricultural Sector Model (Lewandrowski et al. 2004).  
25 The amount of carbon sequestration achieved in the long-run is uncertain since it is unknown when each 
plot will be harvested. If we knew the distribution of final harvest schedules of these forestlands, we 
could calculate the expected amount of carbon sequestered in the long-run. However, since the 
distribution of the harvest schedule is unknown, we only account the amount of carbon sequestered within 
the duration of a contract. 27 
sequestration, through the change of management practice. Antle et al. (2003) find that 
performance-based contracts achieved greater benefits in soil carbon sequestration than 
practice-based contracts.
26 However, existing environmental programs such as the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the Environmental Quality Incentive Program 
(EQIP), and the Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) have offered payments to support 
voluntary changes in management practices rather than to directly support the production 
of environmental benefits by taking into account the spatial variability of ecosystems 
(Antle et al. 2002). We use our simulation framework to compare the additional carbon 
sequestration achieved by these two payment criteria. 
The carbon sequestration trends shown in Figure 2.1 suggest that (without 
considering the risk of fire) an increase in the adoption of ‘FT’ does not increase, and 
may even reduce, the annual carbon sequestration rate, while an increase in the adoption 
of ‘F’ or ‘NA’ can increase the carbon sequestration rate.  Since the goal of the incentive 
payments is to produce additional carbon sequestration, we focus on incentive payments 
targeted to increase the likelihood that ‘F’ and ‘NA’ are chosen.
27 Hence, the possible 
combinations of the incentive payment targets can be classified as follows: i) Provide 
incentives for fertilization only, so only landowners who adopt the choice ‘F’ 
(Fertilization) receive payments and those who implement other activities are not 
eligible; ii) Pay for fertilization no matter what other combined activities are, so 
                                                 
 
26 Antle et al. (2003) also showed that estimated measurement costs to implement the performance based 
contract is less than the efficiency losses under practice based contract.   
27 Note that this is comparable to removing incentives for the ‘Fuel Treatment’ choice. 28 
landowners who choose ‘FFT’ (Fertilization and Fuel Treatment) or ‘F’ receive payment 
(hereafter referred as ‘FFT-T’); iii) Pay only for ‘NA’ (No activity) so only landowners 
who make this choice receive payment; and iv) Provide incentives for both ‘F’ and ‘NA, 
so the landowners who adopt fuel treatment are not eligible (hereafter referred as ‘F-
NA’). 
Finally, we use the simulation results to derive a supply function for carbon 
sequestration based on the annualized carbon price (the incentive payment in $/Mt) and 
the corresponding annualized amount of carbon sequestration. Since this study focuses on 
NIPF landowners in the western U.S., we derive the supply function for this region by 
defining 42 million acres (62%) out of 68 million acres of total private forest lands in the 
region as NIPFs.
28      
2.3.3. Carbon Sequestration Potential under Practice-Based Payments  
Under a practice-based payment criterion, we assume that NIPF landowners are offered 
incentive payments to change their current management to practices that might lead to 
increased carbon sequestration. Hence, each landowner receives incentive payments 
based on the acreage of lands enrolled in the program. We carry out simulations for each 
of the four possible incentive payment targets: ‘F’ only, ‘F’ or ‘FFT’ (FFT-F), ‘NA’ only, 
and ‘F’ or ‘NA’ (F-NA).  
                                                 
 
28 We define NIPF lands as family and individual-owned forests based on NWOS, which include forest 
land owned by individuals, couples, estates, trusts, or other groups of unincorporated individuals. These 
represent 62 % of the private forest land, and 35 % of all forest land in the U.S. (Smith et al. 2009).  29 
Table 2.4-a shows the corresponding carbon sequestration potential in the region 
within the duration of contract. The incentive payment of targeting ‘F’, ‘NA’, and ‘F-
NA’, respectively increases the annual carbon sequestration potential, ranging from 1.3 
MMt to 6.8 MMt for target ‘F’, from 1.1 MMt to 3.7 MMt for target ‘NA’, and from 1.5 
MMt to 4.2 MMt for the combination ‘F-NA’. It is also noticed that as the payment level 
for these targets increases, the amount of carbon sequestration increases at a diminishing 
rate, because of a declining increment of adoption rate, as shown in Figure 2.A.1-a, 
2.A.1-c and 2.A.1-d in appendix.
29 However, for the combination ‘FFT-F’ the 
sequestration potential initially increases, but then decreases if the incentive payment 
exceeds a certain level. Thus, the carbon sequestration potential for the combination 
‘FFT-F’ ranges from 1.1 MMt to 1.5 MMt and then to 0.1 MMt. This is because as the 
incentive payment goes up a higher proportion of landowners choose ‘FFT’, crowding 
out those choosing ‘NA’, which has a larger carbon sequestration potential than ‘FFT’. 
Additionally, the adoption rate of the choice ‘F’ starts decreasing at payments above 
$50/acre because the own marginal effect of the annual LTV of ‘FFT’ is higher than that 
of ‘F’ (Figure 2.A.1-b in Appendix). This suggests that a payment for fertilization 
without restricting the choice of fuel treatment may reduce the carbon sequestration 
potential as the payment level increases. 
Figure 2.2-a shows the corresponding carbon supply function (marginal cost 
curve) for the western U.S. with respect to the annualized carbon prices ($/Mt) under 
                                                 
 
29 Figure 2.A.1 and Figure 2.A.2 in appendix describe adoption rates of each management practices with 
respect to the annualized payments per acre for each incentive payment targets.  30 
practice-based payment. The payment targeting ‘F’ yields the highest annual carbon 
sequestration potential for the prices higher than $105/Mt relative to other payment 
targets, and achieves maximum annual carbon sequestration of 6.8 million metric tons 
(MMt) at a price of $186/Mt, while targeting the ‘F-NA’ option produces the highest 
carbon sequestration potential for prices less than $105/Mt. The payment to not carry out 
any management activities on their property (i.e. payment for ‘NA’) produce 1.7 MMt of 
annual carbon sequestration at 100/Mt, while the payment targeting ‘FFT-F’ achieves the 
lowest carbon sequestration potential with 1.2 MMt at price of $100/Mt, which indicate 
that allowing partial harvests for fuel treatment (FFT) costs higher in carbon 
sequestration than do nothing.    
2.3.4. Carbon Sequestration Potential under Performance-Based Payments  
Under a performance-based criterion, NIPF landowners are offered incentive payments 
based on the amount of carbon stored on their forestlands by adopting a certain MP over 
the duration of the contract, so that each individual is offered different amount of 
payments.  
Table 2.4-b shows the corresponding simulation results for each of the four 
incentive payment targets. As the incentive payment increases, the annual carbon 
sequestration potential increases, which ranges from 2 MMt to 6.3 MMt for target ‘F’, 
from 1 MMt to 4.1 MMt for target ‘FFT-F’, from 1.5 MMt to 3.6 MMt for target ‘NA’, 
and from 2.2 MMt to 6.3 MMt for target ‘F-NA’.  
  Figure 2.2-b shows the corresponding carbon supply function for the western U.S. 
Targeting the management options ‘F’ yields the highest annual carbon sequestration 31 
achieving 3.1 MMt, 5.4 MMt, and 5.8 MMt at the price of $50/Mt, $100/Mt, and 
$150/Mt, respectively. However, note that the trend of annual carbon sequestration along 
the payment levels for targeting of targeting ‘F-NA’ is similar to the case of targeting 
only for the choice ‘F’. This is because, in case of targeting ‘F-NA’, even if the choice 
‘NA’ is eligible to get paid as well as the choice ‘F’, since the carbon sequestration rate 
of choice ‘F’ is greater than that of choice ‘NA’, landowners switch from the choice ‘NA’ 
to the choice ‘F’ to get paid more as the payment level increases (Figure 2.A.2-d in 
appendix). For the combination of ‘F’ and ‘FFT’, the supply of carbon stops increasing 
and begins to decline slightly as the carbon price increases beyond roughly $160/Mt. This 
is because at higher payment levels landowners begin switching from choice ‘NA’ to 
‘FFT’, which reduces the amount of carbon sequestration (Figure 2.A.2-b in appendix). 
At the same time, the amount of carbon gained from increased adoption of ‘F’ is very 
close to the amount of carbon lost from increased adoption of ‘FFT’. Another finding is 
that carbon sequestration potential of targeting ‘FFT-F’ becomes greater than that of 
targeting ‘NA’ as the carbon price increases beyond roughly $130, which is because 
targeting ‘FFT-F’ increases the adoption of the choice ‘F’ as the payment level increases 
(Figure 2.A.2-b in appendix), while targeting ‘NA’ doesn’t (Figure 2.A.2-c in appendix).    
2.3.5. Practice-Based Payments vs. Performance-Based Payments  
In this section, we compare the carbon sequestration potentials in the western U.S. 
between practice-based payment schemes and performance-based payment schemes with 
a 10-year contract. Figure 2.3 shows the annual carbon sequestration potentials in the 
western U.S. with four different MP targets under a two payment scheme. Under the 32 
practice-based payment scheme, at the price of $50/Mt, the potential of carbon 
sequestration in the western U.S. ranges from 0.7 MMt to 1.2 MMt depending on the 
different payment targets. Under the performance-based payment scheme, at the price of 
$50/Mt, the carbon sequestration potential ranges from 0.7 MMt to 3.9 MMt. Overall, 
payment only for the choice ‘F’ yields the highest carbon sequestration relative to other 
MPs under both schemes. The performance-based payment scheme yields higher levels 
of carbon sequestration than the practice-based payment scheme in almost every instance, 
particularly at lower annual payment levels.
30,31 This is because the lands with higher 
carbon sequestration potentials are paid more under the performance-based payment 
scheme. This implies that paying incentives directly to support carbon sequestration by 
taking into account spatial variability performs better than that supporting acreage 
enrollment of a certain management practice.  
2.3.6. Sensitivity analysis  
1) Discount Rates 
In the econometric and simulation analysis, we use a 5% discount rate to calculate 
annualized net returns (annual LTV) and incentive payments. We examined the 
                                                 
 
30 We do not consider measurement and monitoring costs when comparing the cost of carbon between a 
practice-based scheme and a performance-based scheme. If they were taken into account, the carbon 
sequestration potential under a performance-based approach could be more costly than our estimate 
because generally measurement and monitoring costs are greater under a performance-based scheme than 
under a practice-based scheme (Antle et al. 2003, Richards and Stokes 2004, Stavins and Richards 2005). 
31 The exception is no activity (NA) at higher payment levels. This is because as the payment increases 
relatively more high cost-high benefit landowners choose this option under a performance-based 
payment, while more low cost-low benefit landowners enroll under a practice-based payment. The 
difference in benefits is small, and the adoption rate increases faster with the payment under a practice-
based payment scheme. Hence, for high enough payment levels the practice-based scheme outperforms 
the performance-based scheme for NA. 33 
sensitivity of the predicted probability of MP choices and carbon sequestration with 
alternative discount rates of 3% and 7 %. In calculation of annual LTVs (AnnLTV), as the 
discount rate rises from 3% to 5% and 7%, the annual LTV of each MP becomes lower. 
Table 2.5 shows the own semi-elasticities of annual LTVs with alternative discount rates 
through econometric analysis. This indicates that as the discount rate becomes higher, the 
relative magnitude of semi-elasticities of ‘FFT’ and ‘FT’ increases, which implies the 
probability of choosing MPs which allow partial harvest become more responsive.     
An increase in the discount rate changes also the predicted probability of adopting 
the MPs. In particular, as the discount rate increases, the predicted probability of adopting 
the choices including fuel treatment (FFT and FT) increases by 0.2%. This implies that a 
higher discount rate increases partial harvest (i.e. thinning as a type of fuel treatment). As 
a result, the baseline carbon accumulation declines by 0.2 Mt/acre as well.    
The effect of an increasing discount rate on the carbon sequestration potential is 
ambiguous. As the discount rate increases, the level of annualized payments increases as 
well. However, the responsiveness to annual returns also changes with the discount rate, 
so the net effect is ambiguous. Table 2.6 shows the annual carbon sequestration potentials 
at a carbon price of $100/Mt when the discount rate increases from 3% to 5% and 7%. 
When the payment targets only the choice ‘F’, as the discount rate increases from 3% to 
5% and 7%, the annual carbon sequestration increases from 1 MMt to 2.5 MMt, and 2.5 
MMt under practice-based payments, and from 4.4 MMt to 5.4 MMt and 5.7 MMt under 
performance-based payments. The payments targeting the choice ‘FFT’ or ‘F’ (FFT-F) 
and the choice ‘F’ or ‘NA’ (F-NA) showed the same trends with targeting only for the 34 
choice ‘F’ as well. That is as the discount rate increases the annual carbon sequestration 
potential increases at the same level of payment. However, in the case of payment 
targeting for the choice ‘NA’, annual carbon sequestration decreases from 1.9 MMt to 1.7 
MMt and 1.5 MMt under practice-based payments and from 2 MMt to 2 MMt and 1.9 
MMt under performance-based payments at discount rates of 3%, 5%, and 7%. This is 
because of the relatively large decrease in own-return elasticities of the choice ‘NA’ as 
the discount rate increases, which leads to a lower adoption rate of the choice ‘NA’ at a 
discount rate of 7% relative to 3% and 5% even if the payment level at 7% is relatively 
high. However, the result that management practices ‘F’ and ‘F-NA’ yield higher 
sequestration, and that carbon performance-based payments yield higher carbon 
sequestration potential than a practice-based scheme are robust to changes in the discount 
rate, which is the same across the carbon prices.   
2) Contract Duration 
We also conducted simulations with alternative contract durations of 5 and 15 years to 
examine how carbon sequestration potentials and prices of carbon differ with contract 
duration. As the duration of the contract increases, the annual payment level per acre 
increases. This induces an increase in the adoption rate of choosing alternative MPs for 
carbon sequestration, and thus increases annual carbon sequestration potential. However 
since the annual carbon sequestration rate is decreasing over time, it is ambiguous the 
impact of an increase in the duration of a contract on the cost per unit of carbon under 
different incentive payment targets and criteria. In particular, note that if incentive 
payments rise faster than annual carbon sequestration as the duration of the contract 35 
increases, the marginal cost of carbon sequestration will go up. Our simulation results 
suggest that that as the duration of the contract increases from 5 to 10 years, the average 
carbon sequestration potential increases for a given level of carbon price, and hence the 
marginal cost decreases. When contract duration increases from 10 to 15 years, average 
carbon sequestration for a given price tends to decrease, and hence the marginal cost goes 
up.
32  
An example is illustrated in Table 2.7, which shows annual carbon sequestration 
for the various management practices and the two payment schemes at different contract 
lengths at a carbon price of $100/Mt. In general, a ten-year contract yields higher levels 
of carbon sequestration. This is because there is a time lag to achieve a given level of 
carbon sequestration particularly with the choices ‘F’ and ‘FFT’, and thus a 5-year 
contract cannot produce as much carbon as a 10-year contract for a given a level of 
annual payment. With a 15-year contract, because of the rate decreasing yield of annual 
carbon sequestration, the marginal cost to produce an additional carbon is higher than 
with a 10-year contract. The exception to this pattern is the case of payments targeting 
‘NA’, for which annual carbon sequestration potential decreases as the duration of the 
contract increases. This is because a large portion of additional carbon sequestration is 
lost by converting from other practices to ‘NA’ as soon as the decision to convert is 
made. For example, the amount of carbon stored by preventing anticipated thinning for 
fuel treatment accounts for additional carbon sequestration as soon as the decision is 
                                                 
 
32 We only consider the carbon sequestration potential within the duration of the contract. These results 
might change if carbon flows after the termination of the contract are considered.  36 
made.  Nevertheless, the results in Table 2.7 suggest that our results are robust to the 
choice of contract duration. 
 
2.4. Comparison the results with other studies  
It is difficult to compare the results of the carbon sequestration potentials under incentive 
payments in this study with other study results. The main reason is that there are no 
comparable previous studies which examine the carbon sequestration potential by 
managing intermediate practices of forests in response to incentive payments. The created 
carbon supply functions with four different targeting options are comparable with studies 
estimating the cost of carbon sequestration through afforestation. However, to compare 
with the results from other studies, we need to normalize the results by adjusting for 
discount rates, geographic region, and constant-year dollars.  
Stavins and Richards (2005) summarized and compared the 11 studies on carbon 
sequestration potentials through afforestation using the normalized carbon supply 
function. They show that the cost of carbon after normalization to 2006 dollars ranges 
from $35/Mt to $104/Mt for 272 MMt of annual carbon sequestration, and between 
$41/Mt and $124/Mt for 454 MMt of annual carbon sequestration in the U.S.
33  Since our 
study covers only the western U.S. region, we scaled up a regional level supply function 
to the national level by applying our results to 721 million acres of the forestlands in the 
                                                 
 
33 Stavins and Richards (2005) concludes that after normalization to 1997 dollars, the cost of carbon for 
afforestation ranges from $28/Mt to $83/Mt for 272 MMt of national scale annual carbon sequestration, 
and from $33/Mt to $99/Mt for 454 MMt of national scale annual carbon sequestration. 37 
U.S.  This allows us to compare our results with those of other studies. In our results, the 
cost of carbon by targeting the option ‘F’, ‘NA’, or ‘F-NA’ ranges from $92/Mt to 
$210/Mt for 50 MMt of annual carbon sequestration. Only payments targeting option ‘F’ 
can achieve 100 MMt of annual carbon sequestration at a carbon price of $155/Mt. Since 
we take into account only the NIPFs in the western U.S., it is difficult to directly compare 
the carbon sequestration potential with an absolute amount; nevertheless, the result 
suggests that incentive payments for intermediate forest management yield less carbon at 
a relatively higher cost than incentives for afforestation, and hence that the carbon supply 
function for intermediate forest management is steeper than that for afforestation. This is 
shown in Figure 2.4, which compares the carbon supply functions for targeting the option 
‘F’ with those from previous afforestation studies (normalized following the same rule 
applied by Stavins and Richards (2005) and Lubowski et al. (2006)). An important 
implication of this is that changing only intermediate forest management practices 
without extending the rotation period cannot produce as much sequestration as 
afforestation, because the physical carbon sequestration potential per acre is lower than 
that with afforestation. 
 
2.5. Summary and Conclusion 
It is generally agreed that the cost of carbon sequestration through afforestation is 
comparable to or lower than the cost of energy-based mitigation approaches. However, 
we know much less about the cost effectiveness of using incentives to elicit additional 
carbon sequestration in existing forests through intermediate forest management practices 38 
(MPs). This study takes a first step towards filling this void by analyzing the factors 
affecting NIPF landowners’ choice of intermediate forest MPs and examining how these 
choices might change in response to the use of incentives for carbon sequestration. 
Additionally, we simulate the carbon sequestration potential for each MP given different 
incentive payment schemes.  
Our results suggest that that the factors affecting the probabilities of adopting 
intermediate MPs of forests differ by the choice of MPs. The own marginal effects of the 
probabilities of choosing an MP with respect to expected net returns are all positive and 
significant, and indicate that an increase in expected net returns of a certain MP increases 
the probabilities of adopting that MPs. Landowners’ demographic characteristics do not 
significantly affect the probability of choosing a certain MP, while spatial characteristics, 
objectives of forestland ownership, and landowners’ concerns all have significant impacts 
on the choice probabilities.   
The calculated carbon sequestration trends of four different MPs show that the 
choice of ‘Fertilization’ or ‘No Activity’ can sequester more carbon than practices which 
include ‘Fuel Treatment’. This result highlights potential tradeoffs between management 
objectives, as activities such as fuel treatment which are designed to enhance resistance to 
fire, the quality of remaining trees, and biodiversity, do not always increase carbon 
sequestration potential.  
Our simulations of changes in carbon sequestration potential in response to 
incentive payments with different targeting strategies show that targeting the choice of 
‘Fertilization’ yields the highest carbon sequestration potential. Additionally, our results 39 
suggest that a performance-based payment scheme can produce more carbon 
sequestration than a practice-based payment. However, a comparison of carbon 
sequestration supply with other studies shows that the annual carbon sequestration 
potential through changing management practices is not as large as that created through 
afforestation. This implies that the cost of carbon sequestration using intermediate forest 
management is relatively high compared to carbon sequestered using afforestation.     
Finally, we want to highlight that the incentive payment strategies considered in 
this study only focus on carbon sequestration as an environmental benefit provided 
through alternative management practices. If the incentive policy targets one or more 
environmental benefits such as biodiversity, soil erosion, and water quality, the net 
effects of an incentives program will depend on the correlation among the environmental 
benefits considered. 
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2.7. Tables 
Table 2.1. Variable description and summary statistics 
Variable  Variable description  Mean  Std.Dev. 
Annual Net Returns 
AnnLTV1  Annual LTV of Fuel Treatment-Fertilization ($/acre)  41.374  53.538 
AnnLTV2  Annual LTV of Fertilization only ($/acre)  45.699  59.207 
AnnLTV3  Annual LTV of Fuel treatment only ($/acre)  43.297  56.565 
AnnLTV4   Annual LTV of No activity ($/acre)  42.628  54.604 
Demographic Characteristics 
AGE  Age of landowners  62.814  11.461 
Income1-4  Dummies: Household income, less than $50,000 (1) to 
$200,000 or more (4). Income4 is used as a reference 
group in the econometric model.  
-  - 
Education1-5  Dummies: Education level of landowner, less than high 
school (1) to graduate or professional school (5). 
Education1 used as reference group. 
-  - 
Occupation_farm  Dummy: Occupation related to farming, logging, and 
timber industry 
0.162  0.369 
Manager  Dummy: Consulted by forest experts (e.g. logging 
contractor, forester) rather than by family  
0.125  0.331 
Resource Characteristics and Spatial Characteristics 
    Forest_acre  Acres of forestland owned inside of the state (1,000 ac)  1.366  2.617 
SDI  Stand Density Index  274.871  219.218 
PNW  Dummy: Pacific Northwest   0.216  0.412 
PSW  Dummy: Pacific Southwest  0.281  0.450 
NRMT  Dummy: Northern Rocky Mountain  0.138  0.346 
Slope_low  Dummy: Average slope lower than 35 degree   0.634  0.482 
Distance_S2R  Dummy: Distance from the site to main road  4.814  5.168 
Num_Mills50  Number of mills within 50 miles  8.733  12.182 
Landowner attributes 
    Primary_Resident  Dummy: Owners living within a mile of forestland  0.439  0.497 
Obj_biodiversity  Dummy: Objective of owning for biodiversity  0.635  0.482 
Obj_timber  Dummy: Objective of owning for timber harvest  0.265  0.442 
Obj_recreation  Dummy: Objective of owning for recreation  0.483  0.500 
Obj_privacy  Dummy: Objective of owning for privacy  0.655  0.476 
Concern_develop  Dummy: Concern about development   0.425  0.495 
Concern_disease  Dummy: Concern about insects and diseases  0.577  0.495 
Concern_air  Dummy: Concern about air quality  0.298  0.458 
Concern_fire  Dummy: Concern about risk of fire  0.622  0.485 
Costshare  Dummy: Participated in a cost-share program  0.175  0.381 
Green_certified  Dummy: Knowledge about green certification  0.230  0.421 
NTFP_recent  Dummy: Recently harvested non-timber food products  0.125  0.331 
Acquire_bought  Dummy: Land acquisition method: bought  0.620  0.486 
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Table 2.2. Marginal Effects of probabilities of choosing alternative MPs 
Variables 
Choice 1: 
Fuel treatment & 
Fertilization 
Choice 2: 
Fertilization only 
Choice 3: 
Fuel treatment only 
Choice 4: 
No activity 
AnnLTV1  0.0043 (0.0014)
***  -0.0039 (0.0021)
*  -0.0057 (0.0029)
**  0.0054 (0.0035) 
AnnLTV2  -0.0001 (0.0011)  0.0068 (0.0025)
***  -0.0065 (0.0042)  -0.0003 (0.0055) 
AnnLTV3  -0.0030 (0.0013)
**  -0.0007 (0.0021)  0.0204 (0.0034)
***  -0.0167 (0.0037)
*** 
AnnLTV4   -0.0013 (0.0017)  -0.0030 (0.0027)  -0.0079 (0.0052)  0.0122 (0.0071)
* 
Age  0.0006 (0.0009)  0.0008 (0.0012)  -0.0011 (0.0016)  -0.0003 (0.0016) 
Income1  -0.0209 (0.0322)  -0.0122 (0.046)  -0.0245 (0.0582)  0.0577 (0.0613) 
Income2  -0.0156 (0.0301)  0.0521 (0.0397)  -0.1092 (0.0551)
**  0.0727 (0.0558) 
Income3  -0.0238 (0.0329)  0.0157 (0.0439)  -0.0059 (0.0588)  0.0141 (0.0609) 
Education3  0.0155 (0.0289)  0.0478 (0.0411)  0.0249 (0.0541)  -0.0882 (0.055) 
Education4  0.0267 (0.0298)  0.0257 (0.0444)  0.0126 (0.0582)  -0.0650 (0.0595) 
Education5  -0.0228 (0.0348)  0.0065 (0.0477)  -0.0437 (0.0621)  0.0599 (0.0626) 
Occupation_farm  -0.0141 (0.0283)  -0.0658 (0.0439)  0.0994 (0.0505)
**  -0.0195 (0.0533) 
Manager  -0.0100 (0.0276)  0.0101 (0.0444)  0.1206 (0.0564)
**  -0.1207 (0.0614)
** 
Forest_acre  0.0022 (0.003)  0.0027 (0.0053)  0.0030 (0.0069)  -0.0079 (0.0078) 
SDI  0.0001 (0.0001)
*  0.0000 (0.0001)  0.0000 (0.0001)  0.0000 (0.0001) 
PNW  0.0182 (0.0347)  -0.0091 (0.0527)  -0.0071 (0.0717)  -0.0021 (0.0717) 
PSW  0.0159 (0.0269)  -0.0276 (0.0369)  0.0447 (0.0482)  -0.0329 (0.0486) 
NRMT  0.0153 (0.0368)  -0.0051 (0.0467)  0.1222 (0.0619)
**  -0.1324 (0.0661)
** 
Slope_low  0.0344 (0.0236)  -0.0218 (0.0283)  0.0994 (0.0399)
**  -0.1120 (0.0385)
*** 
Distance_S2R  0.0006 (0.0019)  0.0039 (0.0023)
*  -0.0108 (0.004)
***  0.0063 (0.0038)
* 
Num_Mills50  0.0010 (0.001)  -0.0005 (0.0018)  0.0006 (0.0023)  -0.0011 (0.0024) 
Primary_resident  0.0018 (0.0204)  0.0907 (0.0286)
***  0.0998 (0.0377)
***  -0.1923 (0.0375)
*** 
Obj_biodiversity  -0.0286 (0.0211)  -0.0509 (0.0296)
*  0.1149 (0.04)
***  -0.0354 (0.0405) 
Obj_timber  0.0029 (0.0252)  -0.0520 (0.0369)  0.1382 (0.0471)
***  -0.0892 (0.051)
* 
Obj_recreation  0.0392 (0.0207)
*  0.0420 (0.0284)  -0.0645 (0.0374)
*  -0.0168 (0.0381) 
Obj_privacy  -0.0601 (0.0226)
***  -0.0419 (0.0303)  -0.1210 (0.0406)
***  0.2229 (0.0422)
*** 
Concern_develop  0.0567 (0.0222)
**  -0.0719 (0.0308)
**  0.0445 (0.0405)  -0.0292 (0.0416) 
Concern_deasese  0.0097 (0.0256)  0.0947 (0.0391)
**  -0.0579 (0.049)  -0.0465 (0.049) 
Concern_air  -0.0299 (0.0228)  0.0459 (0.0329)  -0.0174 (0.0433)  0.0014 (0.0455) 
Concern_fire  -0.0050 (0.026)  -0.1100 (0.035)
***  0.2374 (0.0527)
***  -0.1224 (0.0526)
** 
Costshare  0.0892 (0.0214)
***  0.0369 (0.0341)  -0.2073 (0.0528)
***  0.0812 (0.0542) 
Green_certified  0.0074 (0.0231)  0.0206 (0.0326)  0.0718 (0.0456)  -0.0998 (0.0471)
** 
NTFP_recent  0.0074 (0.024)  0.0666 (0.0348)
*  0.0558 (0.054)  -0.1298 (0.0585)
** 
Acquire_bought  0.0341 (0.0273)  0.0385 (0.0334)  -0.0048 (0.0455)  -0.0678 (0.0438) 
Log-likelihood  -387.657           
2    411.070           
2 pr     0.000           
Pseudo-R
2  0.347           49 
AIC
 i)  985.315                
BIC
 i)  1430.54           
Observation  513           
Note: 
*, 
**, 
*** Statistical significance at ʱ = 10, 5, and 1 %. Parentheses are standard errors. 
i) The AIC (Akaike’s Information Criteria) and BIC (Bayesian Information Criteria) are known as 
popular measures for comparing maximum likelihood models. AIC is defined as 
  AIC 2 Log-likelihood 2K   , and BIC is defined as    BIC 2 Log-likelihood log KN   , where 
K is number of parameters estimated, and N is number of observations (Burnham and Anderson 
2004).     
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Table 2.3. Semi-elasiticities of probabilities of choosing alternative MPs 
Variables 
FFT 
(Fertilization &  
Fuel treatment) 
F 
(Fertilization 
only) 
FT 
(Fuel treatment 
only) 
NA 
(No activity) 
AnnLTV1  0.204 (0.063)
***  -0.139 (0.071)
*  -0.218 (0.09)
**  0.154 (0.109) 
AnnLTV2  -0.002 (0.049)  0.282 (0.101)
***  -0.249 (0.14)  -0.032 (0.19) 
AnnLTV3  -0.147 (0.051)
*  -0.035 (0.069)  0.699 (0.096)
***  -0.517 (0.105)
*** 
AnnLTV4  -0.056 (0.071)  -0.111 (0.096)  -0.238 (0.163)  0.405 (0.229)
* 
Note: 
*, 
**, 
*** Statistical significance at ʱ = 10, 5, and 1 %. Parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 2.4. Annual carbon sequestration potential with respect to incentive payments 
Payment  
($/acre) 
a. Practice-based payment  b. Performance-based payment 
F  FFT-F  NA  F-NA  F  FFT-F  NA  F-NA 
C Sequestration (MMt) 
10  1.26  1.06  1.09  1.45  2.02  0.97  1.54  2.15 
50  3.72  1.53  2.50  3.17  4.80  2.93  2.70  4.66 
100  5.48  0.84  3.16  3.91  5.79  4.03  3.21  5.82 
150  6.77  0.09  3.67  4.19  6.30  4.06  3.75  6.28 
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Table 2.5. Own semi-elasticities of annual LTVs with different discount rates 
Discount rate 
FFT 
(Fertilization &  
Fuel treatment) 
F 
(Fertilization only) 
FT 
(Fuel treatment only) 
NA 
(No activity) 
3%  0.199 (0.069)  0.339( 0.114)  0.667( 0.094)  0.671 (0.303) 
5%  0.204 (0.063)  0.282( 0.101)  0.699( 0.096)  0.405 (0.229) 
7%  0.236 (0.065)  0.262( 0.100)  0.592( 0.087)  0.253 (0.149) 
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Table 2.6. Annual carbon sequestration potential at $100/Mt with alternative discount 
rates  
Payment 
Targets 
a. Practice-based payment  b. Performance-based payment 
3%  5%  7%  3%  5%  7% 
C Sequestration (MMt)            
F  1.0  2.5  2.5  4.4  5.4  5.7 
FFT-F  0.0  1.2  1.2  0.7  1.6  2.0 
NA  1.9  1.7  1.5  2.0  2.0  1.9 
F-NA  1.8  2.8  3.5  3.6  4.8  6.1 
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Table 2.7. Annual carbon sequestration potential at $100/Mt with alternative contract 
durations  
Payment 
Targets 
a. Practice-based payment  b. Performance-based payment 
5-year  10-year  15-year  5-year  10-year  15-year 
C Sequestration (MMt)            
F  1.98  2.96  2.54  3.18  4.77  4.77 
FFT-F  0.87  1.07  1.06  1.14  1.79  1.37 
NA  1.49  1.61  1.41  2.16  2.06  2.02 
F-NA  2.11  2.52  2.47  3.30  4.42  4.12 
Average  1.61  2.04  1.87  2.44  3.26  3.07 
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2.8. Figures 
Figure 2.1. Carbon accumulation with different management practices and baseline 
carbon accumulation (Mt/acre) 
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Figure 2.2. Carbon supply function for each management option for the western U.S. 
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Figure 2.3. Carbon supply function under different payment schemes for the western U.S.  
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Figure 2.4. Comparison of normalized carbon supply functions for intermediate 
management practices and afforestation 
 
Note: All carbon supply functions except the two from this study are from Lubowski et al (2006). 
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2.9. Appendix 
Figure 2.A.1. Adoption rate under practice-based incentive payment with different MPs 
strategies
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Figure 2.A.2. Adoption rate under performance-based incentive payment with different 
MPs strategies 
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
AGRICULTRUAL LANDOWNERS’ RESPONSE TO INCENTIVES FOR 
AFFORESTATION 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Global warming and global climate change due to the accumulation of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions in the atmosphere for decades is one of the major issues in the global 
economy. Various efforts to mitigate climate change are ongoing at national, regional, 
and individual levels in the U.S.  The forest sector plays an important role in mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions by transferring carbon from the atmosphere through the 
process of photosynthesis of standing live trees and in other forest ecosystem components 
such as the understory and soil (Alig 2010).  Forests offset approximately 13 percent of 
U.S. GHG emissions in 2008 (USDA 2011). Afforestation, tree planting on lands 
previously not in forestry, has been often suggested as one of the strategies for carbon 
sequestration (Adams et al. 1999, Moulton and Richards 1990), and has relatively larger 
potential for carbon sequestration than other land use choices (Gorte 2009). Afforestation 
of crop or pasture land can respectively sequester 2.2~9.5 Mt CO2 eq./acre/year (US EPA 
2005) and 2.7~7.7 Mt CO2 eq./acre/year (Lewandrowski et al. 2004).   
Much of the literature that examines afforestation of agricultural land has focused 
on estimating the costs of carbon sequestration, and has shown that afforestation is a 
relatively low-cost measure for mitigating CO2 emissions. Sectoral model approaches, 62 
such as the USMP and FASOM models, have explicitly modeled the links between 
agricultural land, forest land, and timber markets, and examined the potential for 
offsetting changes in land use (from forest to agriculture) resulting from price feedbacks 
(Adams et al. 1993, Alig et al. 1997, Lewandrowski, 2004). These studies rely on 
financial incentives, mostly tax/subsidy combinations, to measure the costs of 
afforestation programs. They strongly suggest that financial incentives and changes in 
relative returns to land use affect landowner behavior and can be used to increase carbon 
sequestration in private forests.  Parks and Hardie (1995) simulated the impacts of 
subsidies for sequestering carbon in new forests established on agricultural land, and 
derived a carbon supply function through afforestation of marginal agricultural land to 
develop criteria for enrolling lands in a national carbon sequestration program. However, 
Plantinga et al. (1999) argued that these studies tend to underestimate the marginal costs 
of carbon sequestration by simply assuming that landowners will participate in 
afforestation program if the specified agricultural returns are compensated, which ignores 
various factors affecting landowners’ decisions. As an alternative approach to increase 
the accuracy of estimating marginal costs of carbon sequestration through afforestation, 
Plantinga (1997), Plantinga et al. (1999), Stavins (1999), Newell and Stavins (2000), and 
Lubowski et al. (2006) used econometric models to calculate the opportunity costs of 
afforestation, which account for additional factors affecting land enrollment decisions 
such as the cost of acquiring skills, non-market benefits, and so on. The estimated costs 
of carbon are not comparable across studies due to an inconsistent use of assumptions, 
definitions, and methods (Richard and Stokes 2004). Stavins and Richard (2005) showed 63 
that the cost of carbon sequestration ranged from $25 to $75 per short ton of carbon ($7.5 
- $22.5/Mt CO2 eq.) at 300 million tons of annual carbon sequestration with 
normalization to 1997 dollars, based on reviews of eleven previous analyses of carbon 
sequestration costs in the U.S.  
An alternative approach, which has been used less frequently, is to examine the 
carbon sequestration potential of afforestation, as well as its cost, using stated preferences 
based on survey. Although econometric models account for additional factors affecting 
land enrollment decisions such as the cost of acquiring skills, and non-market benefits, 
since most studies are not based on surveys of individual landowners, a lack of 
information about individual landowners’ characteristics and land characteristics is the 
main obstacle to elicit the key factors affecting individual landowners’ land use decisions 
and to improve the accuracy of examining the cost of carbon through afforestation. A 
stated preference approach allows us to examine the various factors affecting landowners’ 
afforestation decisions as a complement to revealed preference studies. Van Kooten et al. 
(2002) and Shaikh et al. (2007) both examined the effects of incentives to encourage 
landowners to plant trees on their agricultural lands in Western Canada based on a survey 
conducted in 2000. The estimated costs of carbon uptake by afforestation in western 
Canada range from $5.7/Mt CO2 eq. to $180.3/Mt CO2 eq.  The important difference of 
our study from these studies is that a continuous measure of acreage or proportion of 
enrollment as opposed to a simple dichotomous measure of participation is used to elicit 
landowners’ willingness to enroll in a tree planting program assuming that each 
landowner owns at least one parcel of agricultural land. A continuous measure of 64 
enrollment allows landowners to choose their amount of enrollment based on the 
different level of incentives offered by considering various heterogeneous factors they 
face. Siikamaki and Layton (2007) used a continuous form questionnaire to examine 
landowners’ willingness to enroll their forestlands in incentive payment programs for the 
protection of non-industrial private forest in response to different level of incentives. 
The objectives of this study are to elicit agricultural landowners’ willingness to 
participate in an incentive program for carbon sequestration through afforestation, to 
examine the key factors affecting landowners’ program participation, to measure the 
potential extent of participation in a tree planting program, and to estimate the 
corresponding potential for carbon sequestration and its cost based on a stated preference 
approach as a complement to other approaches such as revealed preference approach, 
optimization approach, and bottom-up engineering approach. A mail survey supports 
empirical analysis of landowner responses to a hypothetical afforestation incentives 
program. The survey was conducted in two different regions, the Pacific Northwest 
(PNW) and the Southeast (SE). We use the censored regression model (Tobit model) to 
predict the proportion of land enrolled in a tree planting program as a function of the 
various factors affecting landowners decision making and different level of incentive 
payments.  
The proportion of agricultural land willing to plant trees in the PNW region and 
SE region are estimated as a function of incentive payments for carbon sequestration and 
various factors such as landowners’ characteristics and spatial characteristics of 
agricultural lands. The estimation results show that the annual payment for carbon 65 
sequestration significantly and positively affects to landowners’ level of enrollment in a 
tree planting program, while the PNW region is less responsive than SE region associated 
with the increase in annual payment. We also found that the variables which represent 
productivity of lands, spatial characteristics (e.g. distance from fire hazard), and reasons 
for owning agricultural lands affect landowners’ level of enrollment in the program in 
both regions. In the PNW region, landowners’ demographic characteristics do not 
significantly affect landowners’ level of program participation, while they affect 
significantly in the SE region.  
The regional level simulations of carbon sequestration in response to incentive 
payments show that the carbon supply function in the PNW region is steeper than the SE 
region because of the lower adoption rate and less available lands, but the range of carbon 
price is lower than in the SE region because of the higher annual carbon sequestration 
rate. The national level carbon supply function indicates that the cost of carbon ranges 
from $72/Mt to $111/Mt for 300 MMt of annual carbon sequestration, and from $109/Mt 
to $158/Mt for 500 MMt of annual carbon sequestration. This results place higher than 
those obtained from bottom-up engineering approaches and optimization models, and 
include the range of econometric approach done by Lubowski et al (2006) at lower than 
500 MMt of annual carbon sequestration.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents analytical 
framework including econometric model specifications, Section 3 presents the survey 
procedure and variable description, Section 4 examine the landowners’ responses to 
incentives for carbon sequestration and the factors affecting their decisions based on the 66 
estimation results from econometric model, Section 5 presents the simulation results of 
carbon sequestration associated with the change in annual payments, and derives regional 
level carbon supply functions including sensitivity analysis, and Section 6 compares the 
national level carbon supply functions from this study with those from other studies. 
Finally, section 7 discusses the conclusion and implications.      
          
3.2. Analytical Framework 
We assume an agricultural landowner is facing the choice of whether to enroll in a tree 
planting program given incentives for carbon sequestration. The landowner maximizes 
her utility, which is a function of agricultural commodities and amenities such as carbon 
sequestration.  The landowner will plant trees on her agricultural land if the expected 
annual net return through afforestation with an incentive payment for carbon 
sequestration minus conversion cost is at least as much as the expected annual net returns 
in agriculture.   
The primary goal of the econometric analysis is to predict the amount of land 
enrolled in a tree planting program as a function of the various factors affecting 
landowner decision making and different level of incentive payments.    
Because we elicited landowners’ willingness to participate in a tree planting 
program using an open-ended question, we need to carefully consider the possibility of a 
large number of zero or non-responses which can impede estimation of landowner’s true 
willingness to enroll in the tree planting program. In this study, the censored regression 
model (Tobit model), which assumed to observe the dependent variable only if it is above 67 
or below some cut off level,
34 is the first option to run the econometric analysis by 
observing zero enrollment or continuous proportion of agricultural lands actually stated 
by each landowner (Moeltner and Layton 2002, Cho et al. 2005).  Especially, since we 
use the proportion of agricultural land that each landowner, i, is willing to allocate for 
tree planting program, a two-sided censored regression model (Tobit model) is specified 
by the following rule:    
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where yi
* denotes the latent variable for landowner i, yi is the stated proportion of 
agricultural land enrolled by owner i, Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a 
parameter vector which is common to all landowners, and εit is distributed N(0, 
2
  ).  
The log-likelihood function is: 
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where Φ represents the normal distribution function, ϕ represents the normal density 
function, and σ represents the standard deviation. The log-likelihood is made up of three 
parts. The first and third parts correspond to relevant probabilities that an observation is 
censored, and the second part indicates the classical regression for the uncensored 
observations. The expected value of y for an observation is: 
                                                 
 
34 In this study, the true distribution of wiliness to participate in the incentive program is assumed to be 
censored at zero (Halstead et al., 1991). 68 
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And the marginal effect of expected value of y (censored and uncensored) is
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3.3. Survey and Data 
3.3.1. Survey 
The main purpose of this survey is to generate data to conduct an empirical analysis of 
landowners’ responses to an afforestation incentives program. The survey gathered data 
on factors affecting landowners’ decisions regarding use of their land, including program 
participation. Survey respondents were asked a series of questions about their 
demographic characteristics, the types and areas of lands they own, annual net returns 
and level productivity of their lands, the spatial characteristics of agricultural lands they 
own, reasons for owning their agricultural lands, and their understanding and attitudes 
about the importance of environmental services provided by their lands.  
Two comparative regions, the Pacific Northwest (PNW) and the Southeast (SE)
 35,
 
                                                 
 
35 The specific counties selected for the survey are: i) Pacific Northwest region (PNW): Benton, Jefferson, 
Columbia, Lane, Polk, Coos, Crook, Deschutes, Douglas, Josephine, Lake, Marion, Linn, and Clatsop in 
western Oregon, and Grays Harbor, Pierce, Whatcom, San Juan, Clallam, Jefferson, Skamania, and 69 
were selected to conduct the survey, because it has been shown that the Pacific Northwest 
is relatively less responsive to incentive payment for afforestation than the Southeast 
(Lewandrowski et al. 2004, Alig et al. 2010).
36   
Agricultural landowners’ mailing lists for both regions were provided by county 
tax assessor’s offices, except for six counties in Georgia, for which data was purchased 
from qPublic.net, which manages counties’ GIS, parcel, and tax data. 1,000 landowners 
in each region, 2,000 landowners in total, were randomly chosen to participate in the 
survey. A draft of the survey was reviewed by a group of experts (in USDA Forest 
Service, Department of Statistics, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
and College of Forestry in Oregon State University). An in-person pretest was conducted 
with a group of agricultural landowners to design the questionnaires and to establish an 
appropriate bid range of carbon prices. Based on the in-person discussions and expert 
reviews, a total of 42 questions were written, including an open-ended question asking 
recipients’ willingness to participate in an incentives program. We provided a flyer to 
help respondents understand the detailed incentive scheme.    
The mailing procedure and survey design was followed Dillman’s (1978, 2007) 
survey design method. The final sets of survey questionnaires were mailed out on January 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Kitsap in western Washington, ii) Southeast (SE): Alleghany, Ashe, Buncombe, Swain, and Wilkes in 
western North Carolina, and Bartow, Gillmer, Harbersham, Stephens, Catoosa, Walker, Banks, Fannin, 
Lumpkin, Murray, Rabun, and Union in Northern Georgia. 
36 Alig et al. (2010) mentioned that around 80% of U.S. tree planting has been conducted in the South 
region (13 states). This is because i) the South has a large suitable area (marginal agricultural land) for 
planting tree, ii) has relatively shorter harvest rotation because of abundant precipitation and long 
growing season (a favorable climate condition), and iii) has relatively large timber markets because of 
high concentration of wood-processing facilities and highly populated surrounding region (close to the 
Eastern states). 70 
14, 2011, with a personalized cover letter, university letterhead, a flyer explaining the 
incentive program, and a $2 bill as a token of appreciation for survey participation.
37  A 
follow-up postcard reminder was mailed out a week after the first mailing, and a third 
reminder with a replacement survey questionnaire was mailed out a month after the first 
mailing. The final response rates of mail survey are 47% for the PNW region and 27% 
for the SE region.   
Finally, a follow-up phone survey of a sample of non-respondents for the PNW 
region and mail survey for both the PNW and SE region was conducted to assess and 
control for selection bias induced by non-responses. Out of 100 non-respondents (around 
20% of non-respondents) contacted in the PNW region, 27 non-respondents answered the 
follow-up phone survey. Additionally, 26 out of 100 returned a follow-up mail survey in 
PNW region and 38 out of 150 returned a follow-up mail survey in SE region.   
We designed an incentive scheme that is consistent with components of USDA 
Conservation Reserve Programs (CRP), including a 50% cost-share subsidy for 
establishing trees and annual rental payment for the 15-year duration of contract.
38 Based 
on the in-person pretest and expert review, the range of annual rental payment per acre 
offered to agricultural landowners was calculated by multiplying annual carbon 
sequestration rates of proposed species by price of carbon ranging from $1 to $150 per 
                                                 
 
37 Many studies have shown that prepaid monetary incentives can achieve higher response rates (e.g. Salant 
and Dillman 1994, James and Bollstein 1990, Brennan 1992, Hubbard and Little 1988). 
38 The duration of contract of CRP between USDA and agricultural landowners is for 10 to 15 years with 
the longer agreements for land planted to trees (USDA Farm Service Agency 2012). A 15-year contract 
also accounts for the time lag due to tree growth between enrollment and generation of meaningful 
amounts of sequestration (Lewandrowski et al. 2004, Smith et al. 2006). 71 
metric ton of carbon with 12 breaks. The carbon price range assumed to be consistent 
with the average of the maximum carbon price of U.S. EPA (2005) and U.S. Agricultural 
Sector Model (Lewandrowski et al. 2004). Each respondent was asked to reveal the 
amount or proportion of acreage he/she would enroll in a tree planting program, given 
three different levels of per acre annual payments out of 12 breaks offered to each survey 
respondents. We proposed to plant Douglas-Fir for the PNW region and Southern Pine 
(e.g. Loblolly and Shortleaf pine) for the SE region.
39 Thus, annual carbon accumulation 
rates within the duration of contract were calculated by using the carbon accumulation 
table created by Smith et al. 2006. Lewandrowski et al. (2004) mentioned that it is 
reasonable to have a 15-year duration of contract by taking into account time lag to 
achieve a certain amount of carbon sequestration, and Smith et al. (2006) also estimated 
that carbon sequestration rate tend to increase at increasing rate over a 15-year period 
while it depends upon what the tree species are.   
3.3.2. Data  
The dependent variable used in the econometric model is the stated proportion of 
agricultural lands that landowner i would be willing to enroll in a tree planting program.  
The independent variables that might affect the landowners’ level of enrollment in 
a tree planting program can be categorized as follows: annual rental payments, average 
annual net returns of agricultural lands, lands’ characteristics, landowners’ management 
                                                 
 
39 The proposed tree species, Douglas fir and Southern Pine, are most commonly used tree species with the 
highest carbon accumulation rate over time in each region (Lewandrowski et al. 2004, Smith et al. 2006, 
Lubowski et al. 2006). 72 
attributes, and demographic characteristics. The annual rental payment per acre (AnnPay) 
offered to each landowner with a 15-year contract, which is a main variable to examine 
the landowners’ response to annual payment for tree planting program, ranged from $15 
to $192.
40 The average annual net returns of agricultural lands (Agri_Return) are included 
to take into account an opportunity cost of converting from agricultural lands to forests. 
Shaikh et al. (2007) used agricultural net returns from adopting a tree planting program as 
an opportunity cost, which is the weighted average of annual net returns based on the 
land use categories. We expect that an increase in annual net return from agriculture may 
decrease the adoption rate of afforestation, although Shaikh et al. (2007) did not find a 
significant effect of annual net returns on the decision of accepting a tree planting 
program.  
Variables describing land characteristics include dummies for high- and low-
productivity land (D_Highprod, D_Lowprod) to consider the quality of lands of each 
individual. We expect that high productivity lands are less likely to be enrolled in a tree 
planting program, and low productivity lands are more likely to be enrolled in a tree 
planting program. The size of agricultural land (Agland_size) is included to examine the 
effect of the size of land holdings on level of enrollment. The spatial characteristics of 
lands associated with where they are located can also affect the decision of enrollment in 
a tree planting program, although their effect is not well examined in the existing 
                                                 
 
40 IRB (2003) mentioned that Landowners who enroll in CRP enter into cost share contract and annual 
rental payment for the 10 to 15-year contract duration. Annual rental payments range from $30 to $160 
per acre, depending upon local market rates and types of soil.  73 
afforestation studies so far because of lack of information on spatial configuration of each 
land parcel. Zhou and Kockelmen (2008) recognized that variables such as CBD access, 
and distance to the nearest highway, as well as each parcel’s neighborhood attributes can 
affect landowner’s land use and management decision. Development pressure, such as 
distance from major city, contiguity with urban growth boundary, and so on, can affect 
land use choice (Mansfield et al. 2000, Kristensen et al. 2001, Langpap and Wu 2008). 
Potential risk of fire can affect land use and management decision (Amacher et al. 2005, 
Konoshima et al. 2008).  To identify the spatial characteristics of each land based on 
survey, we directly asked landowners whether their agricultural lands are close to home 
(Resident_owner), and are adjacent to highway, forest, agricultural lands, or fire hazard 
(Location).        
Landowners’ management attributes variables include the landowners’ opinions 
on providing environmental services (Envi_) for the public such as preventing soil 
erosion, improving water quality, preserving wildlife habitat, and sequestering carbon. In 
the survey, landowners are asked to rank the importance of providing these 
environmental services for the public with a 5-point scale ranging from ‘not important’ to 
‘very important’. We then included these as dummy variables, so that for each 
environmental service if the importance level is greater than equal to 4, landowners 
consider it is important to provide environmental services. The reasons for owning 
agricultural lands (Reason_) can be important factors affecting level of enrollment in a 
tree planting program as well. Dummy variables are created for each reason, so that 
landowners who gave a ranking of at least 4 for each reason are defined as landowners 74 
who consider that reason important. We expect that landowners who own their 
agricultural lands to produce and sell farm products may be less likely to allocate their 
agricultural lands for forests than landowners who own land for amenity or to protect 
nature.  Additionally, we include dummy variables that identify landowners who adopt 
conservation farming practices (Conserv_Farm), who have been paid incentives 
(D_payment), who own forest (Own_forest), who have experience with afforestation 
(Past_aff), who have a plan for future afforestation (Future_aff), who have family 
ownership (Ownership), and who are members of NGO (Member_NGO) to control for 
possible factors affecting landowners’ adoption rate of afforestation.  
Finally, a number of landowners’ demographic characteristics such as age, 
gender, education, income, and occupation are included as independent variables that 
may have an effect on enrollment in a tree planting program.   
Summary statistics and a description of all these variables are presented in Table 
3.1.     
 
3.4. Estimation Results 
The empirical model setup for Tobit analysis will be:  
0 1 2 3 4 AnnPAY LCH OCH ,  1,..., , i i i i i i y OA i N                 (5) 
where yi is the stated proportion of lands of landowner i would be willing to enroll in a 
tree planting program, PAYi is the per acre payment offered to each agricultural 
landowner, LCHi is a vector of land characteristics, OCHi is a vector of landowner’s 75 
demographic characteristics, OAi is a vector of landowners’ attributes, β are parameter 
vectors, and εi is a random disturbance term.   
3.4.1. Consideration of Sample Selection Bias 
Controlling selection bias is necessary because if there is a relatively large number of 
non-responses of willingness to enrollment, and/or if the response rate is a relatively low, 
then the standard Tobit model, with no consideration of non-responses, cannot examine 
landowners’ true willingness to participate in the tree planting program. Langpap (2006) 
mentioned that if there are a large number of non-responses, the factors affecting a 
landowner's decision to participate in the program and the factors affecting response of 
survey may be correlated, and thus the parameter estimates may be biased. The 
information about non-respondents is collected through a follow-up phone and mail 
survey to conduct a test for sample selection bias. An additional possibility of selection 
bias is considered as well, because those survey respondents who denied participating in 
a tree planting program regardless of the condition of incentives offered were excluded 
from the sample.  A two-step Heckman test for sample selection bias has been commonly 
used to correct the biases associated with sample selection (Heckman 1979, Desvousges 
et al. 1987, Whitehead et al.1993, Messonnier et al. 2000, Cho et al. 2005, Langpap 
2006). A probit model of participation in tree planting program is estimated as a first 
step. This participation model is based on demographic characteristics (age, gender, 
education, income), property characteristics (size of land, land use type), and landowners’ 
opinions on providing environmental services (soil erosion, water quality, wildlife, 
carbon) of both participants and non-participants (including non-respondents) of a tree 76 
planting program. The parameter estimates are used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio, 
which indicates the probability of a landowner having participated in the program. Then, 
the inverse Mills ratio is included as an additional regressor in a censored Tobit model, 
and if the test for sample selection bias shows that it is not significantly different from 
zero, the null hypothesis of no bias cannot be rejected.  
3.4.2. Estimation Results  
The estimated parameters show us the factors affecting landowners’ willingness to 
participate in the tree planting program for carbon sequestration. However, the 
coefficients estimated from the Tobit model are not easy to interpret because they 
represent the change in unobservable y
* with respect to the change in independent 
variables. The marginal effects associated with the change in explanatory variables are 
the better measure to interpret the results.  Table 3.2 shows the analysis of marginal 
effects at mean on the expected willingness to plant trees with a 15-year contract in the 
PNW and SE regions, respectively.   
1) Pacific Northwest region  
In case of the PNW region, in Table 3.2, the marginal effect on proportion of agricultural 
lands landowners are willing to enroll in the tree planting program with respect to annual 
payment (AnnPay) is positive and significant at 1% significance level indicating that $1 
increase in annual payment increases the proportion of land enrollment by 0.209 
percentage point. This implies that if a representative landowner enrolls 10% of 77 
agricultural land in the tree planting program at $100/acre payment, then 1% increase in 
annual rental payment ($101/acre) achieves 10.21% of agricultural land enrollment.   
The marginal effect with respect to lands characteristics shows that the stated 
average annual returns of agricultural lands (Agri_return) has not significant effect on the 
amount of willingness for participation, while the negative sign indicating that increase in 
agricultural returns decrease the proportion of land enrollment in the tree planting 
program. The landowners who own high productivity land (D_Highprod) allocate less 
land for afforestation, and the landowners who own low productivity land (D_Lowprod) 
allocate more lands for afforestation than who do not own it. The marginal effect, with 
respect to size of agricultural land (Agland_size), implies that the larger the size of 
agricultural land, the lower the proportion of agricultural land allocated to afforestation. 
In case of the marginal effects with respect to the variables representing spatial 
characteristics of agricultural lands, lands adjacent to fire hazard (Loc_firehazard) are 
less likely to be allocated to a tree planting program, but the rest of spatial characteristic 
variables do not significantly affect the willingness to participate in a tree planting 
program.  
The marginal effects with respect to landowners’ attitudes about environmental 
services which they may provide for the public show that landowners who believe carbon 
sequestration (Envi_carbon) is very important are more likely to allocate their lands for 
afforestation. However, landowners’ attitudes about other environmental services such as 
preventing soil erosion (Envi_soil), preserving water quality (Envi_water), and providing 
wildlife habitat (Envi_wild) do not significantly affect the level of participation in 78 
afforestation. In addition, landowners who own their agricultural lands to protect nature 
(Reason_nature), and have experienced afforestation in the past (Past_aff), and who are a 
member of NGO (Member_NGO) allocate more agricultural lands for a tree planting 
program, while the landowners who are conducting conservation farming methods 
(Conserv_Farm) are less willing to allocate their lands for a tree planting program.  
In case of marginal effects with respect to the landowners’ demographic 
characteristics, the male landowners (Gender) are more willing to allocate their 
agricultural land for afforestation, while the landowners with graduate school degree 
(Education5) are less willing to allocate their lands for afforestation than with at most 
high school degree. However, other demographic characteristics of landowners do not 
significantly affect the landowners’ willingness to participate in a tree planting program 
independently. Additionally the null hypothesis that the coefficients of education 
dummies and household income dummies together are zero is failed to reject even at 10% 
of significant level.    
Finally, the coefficient of inverse mills ratio of program non-participants 
(IMR_participant) is not significantly different from zero indicating that there is no 
sample selection bias associated with excluding out the non-participants in the analysis. 
2) Southeast Region 
In the case of the SE region, in Table 3.2, the marginal effect on proportion of 
agricultural lands willing to participate in the tree planting program with respect to 
annual payment (AnnPay), which is positive and significant at 1% significance level 
indicating that $1 increase in annual payment increases the proportion of land enrollment 79 
by 0.341 percentage point. Compared to the marginal effect of annual payment in the 
PNW region, the SE region is more responsive to annual payment, which is consistent 
with the results done by previous studies.   
The marginal effects on proportion of agricultural land enrollment for 
afforestation with respect to lands characteristics show that the landowners who own low 
productivity land (D_Lowprod), and whose land is adjacent to forest (Location_forest) 
allocate more lands for afforestation than who do not own it. However, if the land is 
adjacent to fire hazard (Location_firehzd), less land is likely to be allocated in a tree 
planting program. In contrast to the PNW region, high productivity dummy 
(D_Highprod), and size of agricultural land (Agland_size) owned do not significantly 
affect the level of program enrollment.  
Landowners’ attitudes about environmental services for soil, water, wildlife, and 
carbon sequestration show that landowners who landowners who believe carbon 
sequestration (Envi_Carbon) to be very important are more likely to enroll the tree 
planting program.  The marginal effects with respect to the reasons for owning land 
indicate that the landowners who own their lands to protect nature (Reason_nature) 
allocate more lands for afforestation. Finally, the landowners who have received any 
payment in the past (D_payment) are more likely to participate in the program.  
Marginal effects with respect to the landowners’ demographic characteristics 
suggest that as age (Age) increases more lands are allocated for afforestation, but male 
landowners (Gender) allocate fewer lands for afforestation than female landowners. 
Landowners who have a college school degree (Education3), have a graduate school 80 
degree (Education5) are less willing to allocate their agricultural land for afforestation, 
while landowners whose annual household income level is more than $100,000 
(HH_income5) are more willing to allocate their agricultural land for afforestation.  
Overall, the null hypothesis that the coefficients of demographic characteristic variables 
together are zero is rejected at 5% of significant level, which implies that the 
demographic characteristics of landowners significantly affect the landowners’ 
willingness to participate in a tree planting program.    
Finally, the coefficient of inverse mills ratio of program non-participants 
(IMR_participant) is not significantly different from zero at 10% significance level 
indicating that there is no sample selection bias associated with excluding out the non-
participants in the analysis.  
3.4.3. Robustness  
This section conducts the estimation using alternative model specification to check the 
robustness with consideration of unobservable characteristics. Since the landowner i is 
offered three different levels of incentive payments, we suspect the group-wise 
heteroskedasticity facing different levels of rental payments, thus we specified a panel 
Tobit model with random effect with the following rule to correct potential 
heteroscedasticity: 
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for different incentive payment sets t=1,2,3, where the unobserved effect vi is distributed 
N(0, 
2
v  ), and εit is distributed N(0,
2
  ). We assume that ( ) 0 ij E vv  ,  ( ) 0 i it Ev   , and 81 
( ) 0 it ij E   , for all i≠j. 
A disadvantage of the random effect panel Tobit model is that it assumes vi and Xi 
are uncorrelated, thus if this assumption is not satisfied, the estimator will be inconsistent. 
However, since the number of payment set is small, the fixed effect estimator will be 
inconsistent because of incidental parameter problem.  The fixed effects estimator is 
inconsistent when t is not large. Thus, both estimators have problems. A Chamberlain’s 
Random Effect (CRE) Tobit model, rather than a general random effects panel Tobit 
model, can be another alternative which allows vi and Xi to be correlated (Woodridge 
2001). Chamberlain’s conditional estimator provides a way to estimate the fixed effects 
model consistently. The approach is based on conditioning on the group means of 
selected (theoretically relevant) independent variables by including these means in the 
model as additional regressors. Specifically, assume 
2 | ~ ( , ), i i i a v X N X      where 
2
a 
is the variance of  i a in the equation i i i v X a     . Then the CRE Tobit can be 
specified as follows:  
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where  i X  is an additional set of explanatory variables which is constant in each incentive 
payment set, and   is a constant. We also assume that  ( ) 0 ij E aa  ,  ( ) 0 i it Ea   , and 
( ) 0 it ij E   , for all i ≠ j. 
Table 3.3 shows marginal effects on proportion of enrollment in tree planting 
program with respect to independent variables with two alternative model specifications 82 
for two separate regions. The marginal effect on proportion of agricultural land 
enrollment in the tree planting program with respect to annual payment (AnnPay) ranged 
from 0.208 to 0.210 in the PNW region, and from 0.340 to 0.350 in the SE region, which 
are not significantly different from the marginal effect with respect to annual payment 
under the standard Tobit model in Table 3.2.  The LR test failed to reject the null 
hypothesis that vi=0 in the random effect panel Tobit model, and ai=0 in the Chamberlain 
panel Tobit model, and the coefficient of group mean of annual payment (Avg_AnnPay) 
is not significantly different from zero under the Chamberlain panel Tobit model, which 
implies the estimates from standard Tobit model are robust.       
We also conduct estimations using pooled data of two survey regions to check 
how robust the estimation results conducted in previous section using three different 
model specifications: Standard Tobit, Random effect panel Tobit, and Chamberlain panel 
Tobit model. The marginal effects on level of enrollment with respect to annual payment 
are between that in PNW region and in SE region, but more close to that in PNW region. 
Overall, the sign and magnitude of marginal effects and significances of independent 
variables have similar patterns with PNW region.  
 
3.5. Simulation of Carbon Sequestration 
3.5.1. Carbon supply function 
To estimate a carbon sequestration supply function, we conduct a simulation of 
landowner’s response to different levels of annual payment ranging from $0/acre to 
$300/acre with a 15-year contract. The annual carbon sequestration rate is estimated by 83 
using carbon yield tables from Smith et al. (2006) assuming that the stand is periodically 
harvested with a 50-year rotation. As mentioned before, the tree species used for 
simulation of carbon sequestration are Douglas-fir for the PNW and Southern-Pine for 
the SE region, which are the fastest growing species for each region. We account for the 
amount of carbon accumulated in the live tree, standing dead, understory, down dead 
wood, forest floor, soil, wood products, and landfills, but we don’t consider the potential 
emission reductions from fossil fuels when wood products substitute more energy-
intensive materials, or when wood waste is used to generate energy. The areas of 
agricultural lands used in the simulation are 31.2 million acres for the PNW region and 
41.1 million acres for the SE region based on the year 2010, assuming that adoption rates 
from samples apply to entire region.
41 We derive the carbon supply function based on the 
same procedure used by Stavins and Richards (2005), who expressed total cost and 
carbon in response to different rates of annual payments as annualized equivalents with a 
5% discount rate.
42  
Figure 3.1 shows adoption rate and carbon supply function of each region with 
respect to different level of payments, which are the simulation results based on standard 
Tobit model. The results show that as the rates of annual payment increase, the adoption 
rates of a tree planting program increase, and thus carbon sequestration rates increase as 
                                                 
 
41 We apply the available agricultural land area for each region based on Farms, Land in Farms, and 
Livestock Operations 2010 Summary released in 2011 by the National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS), Agricultural Statistics Board, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). PNW region 
includes Oregon and Washington, and SE region includes Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Virginia.   
42 Stavins and Richards (2005) compute the marginal costs of carbon sequestration as the ration of 
increment in annualized costs to the increment in annualized amount of carbon. 84 
well. As shown in Figure 3.1-a, however, since the increment of adoption rate turns to 
decline as the rate of annual payment increases, carbon sequestration also increases at a 
diminishing rate. As we expected based on the marginal effect of each region with 
respect to the rates of annual payment, the adoption rate in the SE region is higher than in 
the PNW region. The carbon supply function of each region in Figure 3.1-b indicates 
that, at $50/Mt and $100/Mt of carbon prices, respectively, the PNW region sequesters 
14.7 MMt and 39.9 MMt of carbon, while the SE region sequesters 28.3 MMt and 57.8 
MMt of carbon.  
3.5.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
Since we derive the carbon supply function with fast growing tree species, Douglas fir for 
the PNW and Southern Pine for the SE region, associated with the change in the annual 
payment for carbon sequestration, it can be overly estimated if the landowners plant other 
species rather than fast growing tree species. Thus we derive the carbon supply function 
by supposing landowners plant mixed tree species and compare with the results from 
planting fast growing tree species. We calculate annual carbon sequestration rate of 
mixed tree species based on the average of annual growth rate of carbon presented in 
Smith et al. (2006) weighted by the proportion of tree species in each region. As shown in 
Figure 3.2, planting mixed tree species makes the supply function steeper since the 
annual carbon sequestration rate with mixed tree species is lower than that with the fast 
growing tree species.   
In Figure 3.2, we also derive the carbon supply function assuming no harvest 
takes place in contrast to periodic harvesting. The figure indicates that the carbon 85 
sequestration rate with no harvest is greater than that with harvest, hence the carbon 
supply function with no harvest is flatter than that with harvest, which is consistent with 
the result from Lubowski et al. (2006).  
It is also important to assess the sensitivity of our results to alternative discount 
rates. The higher the discount rate lowers the present value of both annualized carbon 
sequestration and annualized rental payment (Lubowski et al. 2006). However, this 
makes it unclear that how the ratio between annualized payment and annualized carbon 
sequestration would change with different discount rates. Figure 3.3 shows that as 
discount rates change from low to high, the decrease in the rate of present value of carbon 
sequestration is greater than that of present value of annual payment, thus the carbon 
supply functions become steeper.
43   
 
3.6. Comparison of Carbon Supply Function with Other Studies 
In this section, we compare the carbon supply functions estimated in this study with those 
from other studies. Comparison of the carbon supply function with other studies is 
difficult because of the differences in cost estimation methods used in other studies, as 
well as the differences in assumptions applied such as geographic regions, tree species, 
discount rates, rotation lengths, and constant-year dollars.  Fortunately, there are several 
review papers which have compared the cost of carbon through afforestation from groups 
                                                 
 
43 Because relatively higher growth rate of carbon accumulation in the first three decades, decreasing rate 
of annualized carbon sequestration is greater than that of annualized payment, as discount rates become 
higher. Thus the ratio of annualized payment to annualized amount of carbon sequestration decreases 
when discount rates change from low to high.   86 
of studies by normalizing the different assumptions. For example, Richards and Stokes 
(2004) compared cost of carbon sequestration using 36 studies. Although not all of them 
are directly comparable with a common criterion, the comparison of national scale 
studies based on three different cost estimation methods concludes that the marginal cost 
curve under the econometric approach is much steeper than that under the bottom-up 
approach. Stavins and Richards (2005) summarized and compared the 11 studies on 
carbon sequestration potential through afforestation using the normalized carbon supply 
function by adjusting discount rates, constant dollars, geographic scope, and methods of 
estimating annual costs. They show that the cost of carbon after normalization to 2010 
dollars ranges from $38/Mt to $113/Mt for 272 MMt (300 million ton) of annual carbon 
sequestration, and from $45/Mt and $135/Mt for 454 MMt (500 million ton) of annual 
carbon sequestration in the U.S.
44  Lubowski et al. (2006) also compared their results 
with the results from other previous studies with the same criteria applied in Stavins and 
Richards (2005). 
As we mentioned in the previous section, since we followed the same procedure 
applied by Stavins and Richards (2005), our results are comparable with the results from 
Stavins and Richards (2005) and Lubowski et al (2006) by scaling up the regional level to 
the national level. We scaled up the regional level carbon supply function for the PNW 
and the SE regions to the national level by applying 920 million acres of the agricultural 
                                                 
 
44 Stavins and Richards (2005) concludes that after normalization to 1997 dollars, the cost of carbon for 
afforestation ranges from $28/Mt to $83/Mt for 272 MMt of national scale annual carbon sequestration, 
and from $33/Mt to $99/Mt for 454 MMt of national scale annual carbon sequestration. 87 
lands in the U.S. A simple scaling-up can be problematic, because landowners’ responses 
to incentives and carbon sequestration rates can be different across the regions. To reduce 
shortcomings of scaling-up, we used different annual carbon sequestration rates for 
different forest regions, so that the annual carbon sequestration rate for the entire U.S. is 
the weighted average of carbon sequestration rates with representative tree species for 
each forest region using carbon yield tables from Smith et al. (2006). As results, the cost 
of carbon estimated in this study ranges from $72/Mt to $111/Mt for 300 MMt 
($66/Mt~$104/Mt for 272 MMt) of annual carbon sequestration in the U.S., and ranges 
from $109/Mt to $158/Mt for 500 MMt ($101/Mt~$147/Mt for 454 MMt) of annual 
carbon sequestration. Figure 3.4 shows the result of comparison of carbon sequestration 
costs found by this study with that found by Stavins and Richards (2005), and indicates 
that our study results are within the range of cost from Stavins and Rechards (2005) for 
272 MMt and slightly higher than that for 454 MMt of annual carbon sequestration. 
In Figure 3.5, we compare the carbon supply functions derived from this study 
with those from other afforestation studies derived under different approaches. The 
marginal costs of carbon estimated from our study are higher than those obtained from 
bottom-up engineering approaches (Richards et al. 1993) and optimization models 
(Adams et al. 1993, Callaway and McCarl 1996). Compare to other econometric models, 
the marginal costs estimated from Lubowski et al (2006) place within range of our results 
at lower than 500 MMt of annual carbon sequestration, while the marginal cost curves 
from our study become steeper than Lubowski et al (2006) as total amount of carbon 
sequestered per year increases. The comparison with the marginal cost from Stavins 88 
(1999) found that the cost from our study is higher than his finding at lower than 400 
MMt of annual carbon sequestration, but lower than his finding at more than 400 MMt of 
annual carbon sequestration. 
We also compare our results with the result from the stated preference approach 
conducted by Shaikh et al. (2007). Although it is hard to normalize based on above 
mentioned criteria, our study results place at lower range than those from Shaikh et al. 
(2007) which estimated costs of carbon uptake by afforestation in western Canada range 
from $20.9/Mt of carbon ($5.7/Mt CO2 eq) to $661.1/Mt of carbon ($180.3/Mt CO2 eq).  
Our study results indicate that consideration of various owner-specific factors affecting 
land use decision can make carbon supply functions steeper than those from optimization 
approach and bottom-up engineering approach.   
   
3.7. Conclusion 
This study analyzes agricultural landowners’ willingness to participate in a tree planting 
program, and examines the key factors affecting landowners’ level of enrollment in the 
program based on a survey.  
Using the data collected from a mail survey in the Pacific Northwest (PNW) and 
the Southeast (SE) regions, we estimate the proportion of agricultural lands landowners 
are willing to enroll in both regions as a function of incentives payments for carbon 
sequestration and various factors such as spatial characteristics of lands and landowners’ 
characteristics. The estimation results show that the annual payment for carbon 
sequestration significantly and positively affects to landowners’ level of enrollment in a 89 
tree planting program, while the PNW region is less responsive than the SE region 
associated with the increase in annual payment. We also found that the variables which 
represent productivity of land, spatial characteristics, and reasons for owning agricultural 
lands affect to landowners’ level of enrollment in the program in both regions. The 
marginal effects with respect to landowners’ demographic characteristics shows that the 
landowners with graduate school degree (Education5) are less willing to allocate their 
lands for afforestation compare to at most high school degree in both region, however, in 
the PNW region, overall effects of demographic characteristics on landowners’ level of 
program participation are not significant, while they are significant in the SE region.  
The regional level simulations of carbon sequestration in response to incentive 
payments show that the carbon supply function in the PNW region is steeper than the SE 
region because of the lower adoption rate and less available lands. A sensitivity analysis 
shows that planting fast growing tree species with no harvest has the highest carbon 
sequestration potential, and that carbon supply function shifts up as the discount rate 
increases. The national level carbon supply function suggests that the cost of carbon from 
this study (Stated preference approach) is higher than that obtained from bottom-up 
engineering approaches and optimization models. However, the carbon supply functions 
derived from our study shares a common range of marginal cost of carbon sequestration 
with the revealed preference approach done by Lubowski et al (2006) at lower than 
$170/Mt, while they become steeper than that from Lubowski et al (2006) as the price of 
carbon increases. Thus the results from this study can be a complement of the revealed 
preference approach. Moreover, this study can provide us better understanding of 90 
landowners’ willingness to plant trees on their agricultural lands than the studies based on 
other approaches by considering various factors affecting landowners’ afforestation 
decisions, and will give the policy maker better sense to identify target groups who are 
more likely to participate in a tree planting program.    
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3.9. Tables  
Table 3.1. Summary statistics and description of independent variables 
Variable name  Variable description 
PNW  SE 
Mean  Std.Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
AnnPay  Annual payment per acre  103.50  55.40  99.51  50.96 
Agri_type  Dummy: 1 if Cropland, 0 if Grassland  0.44  0.50  0.29  0.46 
Agri_Return  Stated agricultural net returns ($/acre/year)  196.41  255.46  180.60  261.22 
D_Highprod  Dummy: 1 if own high productive lands  0.514  0.50  0.382  0.487 
D_Lowprod  Dummy: 1 if own low productive lands  0.63  0.48  0.44  0.50 
Agland_size  Size of agricultural land (acres)  70.74  272.61  48.30  59.65 
Resident_owner  Dummy: 1 if lands close to home  0.90  0.30  0.61  0.49 
Location_hwy  Dummy: 1 if lands close to highway  0.54  0.50  0.71  0.46 
Location_forest  Dummy: 1 if lands close to forests  0.33  0.47  0.67  0.47 
Location_agland  Dummy: 1 if lands close to forests  0.86  0.35  0.78  0.42 
Location_firehzd  Dummy: 1 if lands close to fire hazard  0.18  0.39  0.45  0.50 
Envi_soil  Dummy: 1 if preventing soil erosion is 
important 
0.75  0.43  0.88  0.32 
Envi_water  Dummy: 1 if water quality is important  0.79  0.41  0.88  0.33 
Envi_Wildlife  Dummy: 1 if preserving wildlife habitat is 
important 
0.76  0.43  0.78  0.41 
Envi_Carbon  Dummy: 1 if carbon sequestration is important  0.47  0.50  0.54  0.50 
Reason_Sellfood  Dummy: 1 if owning lands to sell agri-products  0.39  0.49  0.54  0.50 
Reason_Invest  Dummy: 1 if owning lands for investment  0.31  0.46  0.34  0.47 
Reason_amenity  Dummy: 1 if owning lands to enjoy amenity  0.90  0.31  0.89  0.32 
Reason_nature  Dummy: 1 if owning lands to protect nature  0.48  0.50  0.80  0.40 
Conserv_Farm  Dummy: 1 if currently adopt conservation 
farming practice 
0.32  0.47  0.22  0.42 
D_payment  Dummy: 1 if ever received conservation 
payment 
0.11  0.31  0.13  0.34 
Own_forest  Dummy: 1 if own forests  0.49  0.50  0.79  0.41 
Past_aff  Dummy: 1 if afforested in the past  0.41  0.49  0.39  0.49 
Future aff  Dummy: 1 if have future afforestation plan  0.51  0.50  0.37  0.48 
Ownership  Dummy: 1 if individual family ownership  0.71  0.45  0.66  0.47 
Member_NGO  Dummy: 1 if member of NGO  0.19  0.40  0.24  0.43 
Age  Age of landowner or main operator  59.59  11.64  60.55  10.61 
Gender  Dummy: 1 if male  0.68  0.47  0.82  0.38 
Education  Dummies: Education level, elementary school 
(1) to graduate school (5)         
HH_income  Dummies: Household income; (1) below $40K, 
(2) $40K-$60K, (3) $60K-$80K, (4) $80K-
$100K, and (5) at least $100K 
       
Occup_Farm  Dummy: Occupation of landowner: 1 if related 
to ranching, farming, forests 
0.19  0.39  0.18  0.38 
Retired  Dummy: 1 if retired  0.39  0.49  0.42  0.49 97 
Table 3.2. Marginal effects with respect to independent variables across the regions 
Variables  Pacific Northwest  Southeastern 
AnnPay  0.209 (0.023)
***  0.341 (0.048)
*** 
Agri_type  -2.286 (3.055)  -10.332 (6.851) 
Agri_Return  -0.009 (0.007)  -0.012 (0.01) 
D_Highprod  -10.804 (3.265)
***  -5.890 (7.209) 
D_Lowprod  6.633 (2.985)
**  10.927 (6.681)
* 
Agland_size  -0.029 (0.017)
*  0.052 (0.047) 
Resident_owner  -1.279 (4.924)  -11.492 (7.456) 
Location_hwy  2.705 (3.228)  -4.531 (6.715) 
Location_forest  2.013 (5.05)  13.064 (7.629)
* 
Location_agland  -2.684 (5.231)  -9.474 (8.465) 
Location_firehzd  -9.379 (3.768)
**  -36.571 (9.268)
*** 
Envi_Soil  4.988 (3.882)  -12.829 (13.75) 
Envi_Water  -7.584 (4.658)  -22.458 (14.821) 
Envi_Wildlife  4.113 (3.741)  1.306 (8.59) 
Envi_Carbon  5.701 (3.227)
*  11.441 (6.277)
* 
Reason_Sellfood  -0.527 (4.725)  -7.564 (6.715) 
Reason_Invest  3.402 (3.767)  -4.049 (7.459) 
Reason_Amenity  8.555 (5.801)  16.008 (10.776) 
Reason_Nature  9.622 (4.677)
**  25.618 (9.214)
*** 
Conserv_Farm  -5.868 (3.147)
*  11.440 (11.791) 
D_payment  1.976 (5.8)  37.500 (10.207)
*** 
Own_forest  0.989 (5.745)  -6.917 (8.779) 
Past_aff  5.226 (3.046)
*  -3.307 (7.79) 
Future aff  7.489 (7.287)  4.165 (9.104) 
Ownership  -3.915 (3.257)  21.106 (7.003)
*** 
Member_NGO  9.240 (3.61)
***  11.852 (9.643) 
Age  -0.103 (0.148)  0.829 (0.385)
** 
Gender  6.502 (3.021)
**  -23.531 (9.103)
*** 
Education3  -3.490 (6.808)  -28.195 (10.591)
*** 
Education4  -7.159 (5.849)  -5.781 (9.661) 
Education5  -8.959 (4.423)
**  -20.068 (10.414)
* 
HH_income2  4.138 (4.315)  -10.044 (12.354) 
HH_income3  -3.456 (5.591)  4.497 (9.494) 98 
HH_income4  1.456 (5.221)  19.674 (13.933) 
HH_income5  -0.174 (4.668)  22.525 (8.281)
*** 
Occup_Farm  -4.059 (4.979)  14.506 (11.728) 
Retired  -2.319 (3.429)  8.596 (7.523) 
IMR_participants  -3.580 (15.29)  13.504 (8.389) 
Log-likelihood  -1250.633  -523.765 
2    206.060  213.470 
2 pr     0.000  0.000 
Pseudo-R
2  0.076  0.169 
AIC
 i)  2581.267  1127.531 
BIC
 i)  2758.520  1271.021 
Observations  621  267 
Note: 
*, 
**, 
*** Statistical significance at ʱ = 10, 5, and 1 %. Parentheses are standard errors. 
i) The AIC (Akaike’s Information Criteria) and BIC (Bayesian Information Criteria) are known as 
popular measures for comparing maximum likelihood models. AIC is defined as 
  AIC 2 Log-likelihood 2K   , and BIC is defined as    BIC 2 Log-likelihood log KN   , where 
K is number of parameters estimated, and N is number of observations (Burnham and Anderson 2004).     
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Table 3.3. Marginal effects with alternative model specifications 
  Pacific Northwest  Southeast 
Ind. Var. 
Random effect  
Panel Tobit 
Chamberlain  
Panel Tobit 
Random effect  
Panel Tobit 
Chamberlain  
Panel Tobit 
AnnPay  0.208 (0.024)
***  0.210 (0.037)
***  0.340 (0.051)
***  0.350 (0.051)
*** 
Agri_type  -2.276 (3.051)  -2.176 (3.053)  -10.449 (6.85)  -10.207 (6.827) 
Agri_Return  -0.009 (0.007)  -0.008 (0.007)  -0.012 (0.01)  -0.013 (0.01) 
D_Highprod  -10.644 (3.324)
***  -10.067 (3.37)
***  -5.999 (7.211)  -7.451 (7.395) 
D_Lowprod  6.669 (2.987)
**  6.850 (3.011)
**  11.141 (6.714)
*  11.761 (6.737)
* 
Agland_size  -0.029 (0.017)
*  -0.031 (0.018)
*  0.051 (0.047)  0.049 (0.047) 
Resident_owner  -1.123 (4.961)  -0.902 (4.923)  -11.805 (7.538)  -12.090 (7.528) 
Location_hwy  2.671 (3.228)  2.708 (3.222)  -4.368 (6.741)  -4.266 (6.731) 
Location_forest  1.992 (5.043)  2.197 (5.031)  12.941 (7.648)
*  11.802 (7.718) 
Location_agland  -2.624 (5.232)  -2.333 (5.241)  -8.966 (8.688)  -7.935 (8.725) 
Location_firehzd  -9.398 (3.768)
**  -9.425 (3.79)
**  -36.297 (9.33)
***  -36.480 (9.355)
*** 
Envi_Soil  4.946 (3.878)  4.813 (3.886)  -12.611 (13.729)  -11.105 (13.783) 
Envi_Water  -7.565 (4.654)  -7.765 (4.676)
*  -22.182 (14.865)  -23.846 (14.913) 
Envi_Wildlife  4.075 (3.74)  3.729 (3.752)  1.153 (8.601)  1.595 (8.619) 
Envi_Carbon  5.824 (3.262)
*  6.192 (3.265)
*  11.548 (6.285)
*  12.120 (6.315)
* 
Reason_Sellfood  -0.546 (4.721)  -0.312 (4.711)  -7.747 (6.771)  -8.243 (6.75) 
Reason_Invest  3.373 (3.764)  3.132 (3.775)  -4.671 (7.812)  -5.047 (7.786) 
Reason_Amenity  8.693 (5.82)  9.467 (5.864)  15.773 (10.789)  15.960 (10.796) 
Reason_Nature  9.623 (4.674)
**  9.341 (4.694)
**  25.598 (9.213)
***  25.602 (9.156)
*** 
Conserv_Farm  -5.811 (3.152)
*  -5.491 (3.171)
*  11.346 (11.814)  10.495 (11.839) 
D_Payment  2.020 (5.795)  2.550 (5.828)  37.426 (10.256)
***  37.021 (10.238)
*** 
Own_forest  1.062 (5.744)  1.052 (5.729)  -7.213 (8.834)  -6.279 (8.916) 
Past_aff  5.194 (3.044)
*  5.131 (3.049)
*  -3.358 (7.781)  -2.616 (7.8) 
Future_aff  7.545 (7.284)  7.098 (7.287)  4.727 (9.36)  6.510 (9.524) 
Ownership  -3.917 (3.253)  -4.155 (3.26)  21.273 (7.041)
***  22.488 (7.15)
*** 
Member_NGO  9.230 (3.607)
**  9.032 (3.637)
**  12.064 (9.684)  12.603 (9.66) 
Age  -0.101 (0.148)  -0.099 (0.148)  0.822 (0.387)
**  0.734 (0.398)
* 
Gender  6.517 (3.018)
**  6.429 (3.037)
**  -23.645 (9.104)
***  -22.855 (9.126)
** 
Education3  -3.348 (6.825)  -3.364 (6.792)  -28.247 (10.585)
***  -28.954 (10.578)
*** 
Education4  -6.953 (5.898)  -6.475 (5.883)  -5.898 (9.66)  -8.041 (9.97) 
Education5  -8.847 (4.441)
**  -8.499 (4.449)
*  -20.358 (10.488)
*  -22.291 (10.681)
** 
HH_income2  4.190 (4.315)  4.392 (4.318)  -9.744 (12.418)  -6.907 (12.743) 
HH_income3  -3.352 (5.603)  -3.329 (5.587)  4.863 (9.592)  6.915 (9.848) 100 
HH_income4  1.583 (5.239)  1.856 (5.219)  19.835 (13.961)  21.834 (14.151) 
HH_income5  -0.127 (4.665)  0.072 (4.657)  22.801 (8.352)
***  24.228 (8.494)
*** 
Occup_Farm  -4.040 (4.97)  -4.240 (4.966)  14.577 (11.74)  16.869 (11.969) 
Retired  -2.295 (3.426)  -2.276 (3.421)  8.785 (7.562)  10.614 (7.808) 
IMR_participants  -3.364 (15.297)  -3.706 (15.238)  13.579 (8.389)  13.065 (8.407) 
Avg_AnnPay  - 
 
-0.072 (0.082)  -    -0.190 (0.216) 
Log-likelihood  -1250.599   -1249.479   -523.730   -523.355  
2    128.120   114.970   113.580   115.620  
2 pr     0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
AIC
 i)  2583.198   2582.958   1129.460   1130.710  
BIC
 i)  2764.882   2769.074   1276.538   1281.375  
LR test (H0: v=0):              
   2    0.07   1.41   0.07   0.01  
   2 pr      0.397   0.118   0.395   0.459  
Observations  621   621   267   267  
Note: 
*, 
**, 
*** Statistical significance at ʱ = 10, 5, and 1 %. Parentheses are standard errors. 
i) The AIC (Akaike’s Information Criteria) and BIC (Bayesian Information Criteria) are known as 
popular measures for comparing maximum likelihood models. AIC is defined as 
  AIC 2ln likelihood 2K   , and BIC is defined as    BIC 2ln likelihood ln( ) KN   , where K is 
number of parameters estimated, and N is number of observations (Burnham and Anderson 2004).     
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3.10. Figures 
Figure 3.1. Adoption rate and carbon supply function of each region 
a. Adoption rate        b. Carbon supply function  
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Figure 3.2. Carbon supply functions with different assumptions of harvest and tree 
species 
a. Pacific Northwest        b. Southeast 
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Figure 3.3. Carbon supply functions with alternative discount rates 
a. Pacific Northwest        b. Southeast 
   104 
Figure 3.4. Comparison of marginal cost of carbon with other studies 
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Figure 3.5. Comparison of carbon supply functions with other studies 
 
Note: All carbon supply functions except the four from this study are from Lubowski et al (2006), and 
normalized at 2010 dollar. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
TARGETING INCENTIVES FOR CARBON SEQUESTRATION WITH 
SPATIALLY HETEROGENEOUS LAND TYPES UNDER ASYMMETRIC 
INFORAMTION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Several studies have shown that forest-based mitigation activities can offset a large 
portion of carbon emissions with similar or lower cost than energy-based mitigation 
approaches (Richards and Stokes 2004, van Kooten et al. 2004, Stavins and Richards 
2005, Mason and Plantinga 2011). Incentive programs have been suggested to encourage 
adoption of afforestation, reforestation, and certain silvicultural treatments to produce 
additional carbon sequestration, and several studies have analyzed and compared their 
efficacy and cost effectiveness (Lewandrowski et al. 2004, Lubowski et al. 2006, Gorte 
2009, Johnson 2009). However, Murray et al. (2007) argued that carbon sequestration 
under an incentive program may not be entirely additional compared to what would be 
achieved without incentives, and that other factors could lead to lower amounts of carbon 
sequestration compared to what an incentive policy intends to achieve. For example, 
inefficient policy targeting strategies and asymmetric information can prevent optimal 
allocation of funds for boosting forest carbon sequestration given a budget constraint, and 
thus the amount of carbon sequestration actually achieved by the incentive policy might 
be lower than what the policy makers expected to achieve.  
There are several studies which address the issue of losses of environmental 107 
benefits induced by suboptimal contract targeting
45 and asymmetric information. Some 
authors have compared the relative environmental performances of an incentive program 
under alternative targeting criteria and examined the potential benefit losses caused by 
suboptimal targeting. For example, Babcock et al. (1996) compared the environmental 
benefits of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in terms of water erosion, wind 
erosion, surface water quality, and wildlife habitat under three alternative targeting 
criteria (benefit-to-cost ratio targeting, benefit targeting, and cost targeting) by 
considering cost and benefit heterogeneity. Babcock et al. (1997) argue that the wrong 
targeting tools to acquire environmental benefits can increase  public expenditures, and 
that the difference in total benefits among alternative targeting criteria depend on the 
correlation between benefits and costs and their relative spatial variability. Zhao et al. 
(2003) compared the environmental impact of a subsidy directly targeting conservation 
tillage relative to targeting environmental benefits achieved through adoption of 
conservation tillage under heterogeneous costs and benefits. Antle et al. (2003) shows 
that a performance-based contract (per ton based payment) that takes into account spatial 
variability performs better than a practice-based contract (per acre based payment), even 
if additional costs to implement a performance-based contract are accounted.  
Although an optimal targeting tool is applied, in the presence of asymmetric 
information an efficient outcome cannot be achieved because the marginal costs of 
                                                 
 
45  Babcock et al. (1997) introduced three different targeting rules which are based on cost (acreage), 
benefit, and benefit to cost ratio. They defined the defined benefit-to-cost ratio targeting as optimal 
targeting tool, and benefit targeting and cost (acreage) targeting as suboptimal targeting tool, and 
compared environmental performances of suboptimal targeting relative to optimal targeting given 
spatially heterogeneous land types in terms of costs and benefits. 108 
environmental benefits (carbon sequestration in this paper) faced by the policy maker are 
higher than the true level of marginal cost. The reason is that low cost types have an 
incentive (i.e. information rent) to pretend to be high cost types. Wu and Babcock (1996) 
show that the socially optimal level of benefits cannot be achieved when there is 
information asymmetry between the government and farmers. They recognized farmers’ 
potential moral hazard by misrepresenting their cost types, because the government has 
less information than farmers to identify each individual farmer's cost types. Ferraro 
(2008) argues that reducing informational rents is important to maximize the amount of 
services obtained from limited budgets in the context of payments for environmental 
services. He adds that reducing informational rents also mitigates concerns about loss of 
benefits. Crépin (2005) examines the use of incentives to create wetlands in an 
asymmetric information context. She uses a theoretical principal-agent model to show 
that contract choice can create welfare gains, and that the choice of contract depends on 
the distribution of the unobserved landowner type, the elasticity of costs and benefits to 
wetland size changes, and on the costs of acquiring information. Sheriff (2009) discusses 
the possibility of inefficient allocations in a conservation payment program because of 
hidden information, and evaluates the relative costs of alternative land conservation 
mechanisms based on an empirical methodology by using commonly accessible data 
from government to identify the technology and distribution of types. Recently, Mason 
and Plantinga (2011) examine a contract scheme to mitigate the asymmetric information 
problem for forest carbon sequestration, and find that the optimal contract scheme is less 
costly than the uniform subsidy.  109 
In previous studies the issues of inefficient outcomes induced by suboptimal 
contract targeting and asymmetric information have only been considered separately. In 
this paper, as a different feature from previous studies, I combine alternative contract 
targeting criteria and asymmetric information to analyze the relative performance, in 
terms of environmental benefits, of an incentive program aimed at forest carbon 
sequestration. Additionally, I consider spatial heterogeneity in costs and benefits to 
examine the relative performances of alternative incentive programs. There are several 
studies which mention that inherent heterogeneity in farm production and environmental 
outcomes must be taken into account for conservation programs because farm production 
and environmental benefits may vary across space due to different climate conditions and 
land qualities (Wu and Babcock 1996, Babcock et al. 1997, Zhao et al. 2003, Antle et al. 
2003). Specifically, Babcock et al. (1997) showed that highly variable, negatively 
correlated benefits and costs perform better in producing environmental benefits, and that 
if cost variability is greater than benefit variability, particularly with negative correlation, 
acreage targeting becomes more consistent with optimal targeting (BC ratio targeting). 
However, this study has not been examined in the context of asymmetric information. In 
this essay, I incorporate asymmetric information into choice of targeting strategies given 
spatially heterogeneous cost and benefit types to examine how the presence of 
asymmetric information affects these findings. This is important because if their findings 
fail to hold under asymmetric information, then the conditions which yield an optimal 
outcome under perfect information are no longer optimal conditions under asymmetric 
information.  110 
Thus, the main objective of this essay is to assess the benefits achieved by an 
incentive program using alternative targeting criteria in the presence of asymmetric 
information and heterogeneity in costs and benefits. More specifically, this essay will 
examine i) the relative environmental performances in terms of carbon sequestration and 
potential carbon benefit losses caused by asymmetric information under alternative 
targeting criteria, and how they may differ for different combinations of spatial 
variability between benefits and costs and the correlation between them, ii) under what 
conditions of spatial characteristics of benefits and costs, the findings under asymmetric 
information are consistent or inconsistent with those under perfect information, and iii) 
how asymmetric information, variability of benefits and costs, and their correlation, may 
affect the carbon supply function of afforestation in the PNW. 
The results show that in the presence of asymmetric information, the combination 
of high cost-high benefit variability and negative correlation, which is the combination 
that achieves the greatest benefit gains under perfect information, can result in the 
greatest benefit losses. This implies that the greater the benefit gains under perfect 
information the greater the possibility of a loss of benefit under asymmetric information, 
and thus that for certain conditions the findings from this study are not consistent with 
those from Babcock et al. (1997). Specifically, a comparison of two targeting schemes 
shows that if cost variability is greater than benefit variability with negative correlation, 
the benefit achieved under benefit-cost ratio targeting can be lower than that under 
acreage targeting because of asymmetric information, so that an optimal targeting 111 
strategy under perfect information may no longer be optimal under asymmetric 
information.  
A numerical analysis of carbon benefits through an afforestation program in the 
Pacific Northwest (PNW) region shows that the magnitude of carbon benefit losses 
associated with asymmetric information under benefit-cost ratio targeting is greater than 
that under acreage targeting. The carbon supply functions for the PNW region derived 
from this study show that as the degree of asymmetric information becomes greater, the 
carbon supply functions become steeper, and thus carbon sequestration becomes more 
expensive, while the price of carbon depends upon the spatial variability of carbon 
sequestration rates per acre and correlations between costs and carbon sequestration rates.   
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
conceptual background and analytical framework, section 3 conducts numerical analyses 
under asymmetric information with various combinations of spatial variability and 
correlations, section 4 describes the results of numerical analyses of carbon sequestration 
through afforestation program in the PNW region, and derives carbon supply functions 
with respect to different level of variability, correlation, and degree of asymmetric 
problem, section 5 shows the key findings and the conclusion.    
 
4.2. Analytical Framework 
Suppose there are spatially heterogeneous types of forests in terms of costs and benefits 
of enrolling in an incentive program to increase carbon sequestration. For example, in 
Figure 4.1, forest land types can be classified into one of four regions in the cost-benefit 112 
plane (Babcock et al. 1997). Type I corresponds to low transition cost
46 and high level of 
carbon sequestration, Type II to high transition cost and high level of carbon 
sequestration, Type III corresponds to low transition cost and low level of carbon 
sequestration, and Type IV to high transition cost and low level of carbon sequestration.  
I set up a conceptual model which considers two different targeting criteria and 
scenarios with and without asymmetric information.  
4.2.1. Targeting strategies under perfect information 
Suppose the policy maker propose an incentive program with per acre payments to 
individual landowners to produce additional carbon sequestration by changing land use or 
management practices. Individual landowners are assumed to participate in this program 
as long as their opportunity costs per acre by giving up their current land use or 
management practices are fully compensated. The policy maker has a budget of M to 
implement this incentive program. The area of land that can be conserved for carbon 
sequestration is denoted by xi, for individual land types i=1,2,…I. For simplicity, the 
costs of producing x are assumed to be linear, expressed by C(xi) = cixi, where ci are 
marginal costs per acre of each land type i. The environmental benefit of carbon 
sequestration in x is assumed to be linear as well, expressed by B(xi) = bixi
 for i=1,2,…,I. 
Suppose we consider two different targeting strategies following Babcock et al. 
(1997): Acreage maximization targeting (hereafter referred to as “Acreage targeting”), 
                                                 
 
46 The transition cost implies the cost generated by adoption of a certain forest management practices or by 
land use conversion from other uses to forests.  113 
and benefit-cost ratio maximization targeting (hereafter referred to as “BC ratio 
targeting”). Under acreage targeting, the policy maker’s optimization problem with 
perfect information is specified as follows:  
11
max , s.t.  M.
II
i i i
ii
x c x

   
The Lagrange function for the problem is 
11
II
i i i
ii
L x M c x 


   
  , where λ is 
the shadow price of the budget constraint (M). Then the optimal solutions are given by 
*
i x  
and 
*  . Thus, 
*
*
*
0 if 1
 if 1
i
i
ii
c
x
xc


    
  
 , so that the critical level of marginal cost c
* is given 
by 
* 1 i c   . Hence land with 
* 1 i c   will not be enrolled in the carbon sequestration 
program, while land with  
* 1 i c    will be enrolled in the program. As the budget level 
(M) increases, the critical level of marginal cost (
* c ) increases, because 
* 0 M     .  
Under BC ratio targeting, the policy maker’s optimization problem with perfect 
information is specified as follows:  
11
max , s.t.  M.
II
i i i i
ii
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The Lagrange function for the problem is 
11
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optimal solution of x for individual i is given by 
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 , so that land 
with 
*
ii bc   will be enrolled in the carbon sequestration program, while land with 114 
*
ii bc    will not be enrolled in the program. Additionally, 
* 0 M     , which implies 
that as the total budget (M) increases, the critical benefit-cost ratio (b/c) decreases.       
4.2.2. Targeting strategies under asymmetric information 
I consider the type of asymmetric information problem induced by unknown cost type, 
because it is difficult for policy makers to observe the true marginal cost of additional 
land enrollment of each individual forestland when the landowner overstates its cost. 
Suppose there is asymmetric information and the policy maker does not know the 
landowners’ cost ci. In this case a low cost type has incentive to pretend he is a high cost 
type to get a higher payment for producing xi.  For simplicity, suppose first that there are 
only two different land types in terms of marginal cost per acre, and suppose the marginal 
cost of type 1 is greater than that of type 2, i.e. c1  > c2. In the perfect information 
scenario, they are offered per acre payment c1 and c2 respectively. Since c1 > c2, with 
asymmetric information type 2 has incentive to pretend he is a high cost type to get 
higher payment c1 from producing x2. By doing so, type 2 can be offered the 
compensation c1x2, but its actual costs will be c2x2, and thus type 2 gets additional profit 
of c1x2 − c2x2 > 0, which can be interpreted as information rents of type 2.  
If there are many different types of lands, then the landowners whose marginal 
costs are lower than the critical level (c
*) have an incentive to overstate their true 
marginal cost to get higher payments.  I assume that landowners can observe the critical 
level of marginal cost that determines eligibility to enroll in the program from historical 115 
records of enrollment.
47 Low cost landowners therefore will have an incentive to 
overstate their cost up to this critical level c
*.  Specifically, under acreage maximization 
targeting, I assume a low cost type uses the highest cost (
* c ) as a reference to choose the 
stated costs because stated costs higher than the critical level would not be enrolled in the 
program. Then, the stated marginal cost under asymmetric information of the low cost 
type will be 
* ˆ () i i i c c c c     , where 
*
i cc   and  (0,1]    represents the degree of 
asymmetric information determined by the level of regulator’s ability to monitor or 
discriminate an actual cost type of land
48, thus 
* ˆii c c c . Figure 4.2 shows how costs 
change under asymmetric information with different targeting schemes graphically. As 
shown in Figure 4.2-a, a landowner with cost  i c  gives a stated cost  ˆi c  somewhere 
between  i c  and 
* c , depending on  . Then, the policy maker’s budget constraint will be 
1
ˆ M 
I
ii
i
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
  , and the optimal solution 
* ˆi x  in the presence of asymmetric information 
when 01    will be 
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*
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ˆ
ˆ ˆ  if 1
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
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  
, so that the critical level of marginal cost 
* ˆ c is given by 
* * * ˆ ˆ 1 cc   .  Note that if  1    this is equivalent to the case of a uniform 
payment per acre in terms of marginal cost. It is clear that since the low cost types 
                                                 
 
47 For example, landowners can access through internet or request the historical records of the annual rental 
payment of federally funded conservation program such as Conservation Reserve Program, Wetland 
Reserve Program, and Environmental Quality Incentives Program.    
48  0   implies policy maker has perfect knowledge about the marginal cost of each type, while  1  
implies policy maker has no ability to observe the marginal cost of each type.      116 
overstate their costs, given level of budget, more lands will be ruled out from the 
incentive program.  
Under BC ratio targeting, the land where 
*
ii bc    is enrolled in the program, 
thus the landowners for whom 
*
ii bc    have an incentive to pretend to be the high cost 
type by increasing their stated marginal cost to be where 
**
ii bc   given  i b  remains the 
same. Thus, as shown in Figure 4.2-b, a landowner with cost  i c  has an incentive to state a 
cost  ˆi c  between  i c  and 
*
i c given  i b . The marginal cost of a low cost type under 
asymmetric information will be 
* ˆ () i i i i c c c c     , where  (0,1]    and 
*
*
1
ii cb
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  which 
represents critical level of marginal cost given  i b  and 
*
ii cc  . Then, the budget constraint 
will be 
1
ˆ M
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* ˆi x  in the presence of asymmetric 
information when 01    is 
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ii
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x b c


    
  
, thus, the lands with 
* ˆ ˆ ii bc   will 
be enrolled in the incentive program. Since 
* ˆii cc  , the critical level of benefit-cost ratio 
under asymmetric information (
* ˆ  ) is greater than that under perfect information (
*  ), 
which implies that fewer parcels will enroll for a given budget.  
Suppose costs and benefits are continuously distributed, and suppose f (b) and f(c) 
are the marginal density functions of benefits (b) and costs (c) respectively, where c
represents cost types of land determined by per acre annual cost of candidate land, 
c c c , and b represents benefit types of lands determined by per acre annual carbon 117 
sequestration rates, b b b . Then the joint density function is  ( , ) f c b  and the total 
share of acreage will be defined as  ( , )
bc
bc f c b dcdb  . The distribution of land types is 
assumed to be known to policy maker, but the cost type of particular individual is 
assumed to be unknown under asymmetric information.   
Under acreage targeting, given budget constraints, the highest bid (c
*) under 
perfect information will be given by 
* 1/ , which is the marginal cost of one unit of land. 
Then, acreage enrolled under perfect information is 
* **
10 ( , ) ( , )
cb
cb X X c b X f c b dcdb   , 
where  0 X  is total candidate land. However in the presence of asymmetric information 
associated with unknown cost type, the total acreage enrolled will be determined by the 
critical marginal cost 
** ˆ ˆ 1/ c   , which is less than the critical level under perfect 
information (
* c ) as long as  0   . This leads to some of the lands being bid out of the 
program ( 1 TA  ), which leads loss of benefit ( 1 TB  ) as well. Thus, total acreage enrolled 
with unknown cost type is
* ˆ *
10 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ) ( , )
cb
cb X X c b X f c b dcdb   , total acreage loss is
**
1 1 1 ˆ 0 TA X X     , and total benefit loss is
** ˆ
1 0 0 ˆ ˆ ( , ) ( , ) 0
c b c b
c b c b TB X b f c b dcdb X b f c b dcdb           .  
Under BC ratio targeting, since the land for which the benefit-cost ratio (b/c) is 
greater than or equal to 
*   is enrolled under perfect information, total acreage enrolled is 
**
2 ( , ) X X c c 
* 0 ( , )
cb
cc X f c b dcdb
   . However, in the presence of asymmetric 118 
information, the total acreage enrolled with unknown cost type will be determined by the 
cost for which the critical ratio of benefit and cost is 
* ˆ   which is greater than 
*   given 
fixed level of budget since 
** ˆ cc  . Thus, total acreage enrolled with unknown cost is
 
* ˆ / *
20 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , ( , )
bb
cb X X c b X f c b dcdb

  , total acreage loss is 
**
2 2 2 ˆ 0 TA X X     , and 
total benefit loss is 
*
*
ˆ /
2 0 0 ˆ ˆ ( , ) ( , ) 0
c b b b
c c c b TB X b f c b dcdb X b f c b dcdb

           . 
The amount of benefit loss associated with asymmetric information also depends 
on the size of the budget (M). It is clear that as the size of the budget increases the critical 
level of marginal cost of land enrollment under acreage targeting and the critical ratio of 
benefits and costs under BC ratio targeting increase. I can also expect that as the distance 
from the marginal costs of low cost types to the critical level of marginal cost ( 
* || ii cc  ) 
become greater, the low cost type’s information rent become larger, and thus the 
magnitude of benefit loss becomes larger as the size of the budget increases. 
4.2.3. Effect of spatial characteristics under asymmetric information 
Given the assumption that benefits and costs are jointly distributed, it is reasonable to 
expect that the characteristics of the joint distribution of benefits and costs, ( , ) f c b , affect 
the magnitude of benefit loss in the presence of asymmetric information. Babcock et al. 
(1997) have shown how the characteristics of the joint distribution of benefits and costs, 119 
such as a spatial variability
49 of costs and benefits and the correlation between them, 
affect the environmental outcomes of different targeting schemes. They showed that the 
benefits from benefit targeting are larger when the variability of benefits is greater, and 
similarly that the benefits from cost targeting are larger when the variability of costs is 
greater. In addition, for a given budget constraint, desired levels of environmental 
outcomes can be better achieved when benefits and costs are negatively correlated, 
regardless of targeting schemes. However, if we assume there is asymmetric information 
in terms of marginal costs, it is unclear that the findings of Babcock et al. (1997) still 
hold. Thus in this section I examine how the change in cost-benefit variability and 
correlation would affect the amount of benefits achieved by an incentive program under 
asymmetric information with two different contract targeting criteria: BC ratio targeting 
and acreage targeting. 
1) Effect of spatial variability      
Figure 4.3 shows how increases in spatial variability of costs and benefits affect the 
degree of loss of benefits. The dark shaded area represents relatively low variability, and 
as variability becomes greater, cost or benefit types disperse more widely to the light 
shaded area. I assume 50% of land enrollment in the program given targeting strategies 
under perfect information, so that the lands in area P, Q, and R in Figure 4.3 are enrolled 
in the incentive program. Area P represents relatively low cost type in terms of costs 
                                                 
 
49 Spatial variability is the degree of spatial inequality. Given the same mean value of benefit or cost, 
greater spatial inequality of cost or benefit implies a greater spatial variability of costs or benefits 
(Babcock et al. 1997).  120 
variability, and relatively high benefit type in terms of benefit variability compared to 
area Q and R. It is clear that the greater variability achieves the greater benefits under 
perfect information, since more lands in area P are enrolled first. Suppose there is 
asymmetric information in costs, and thus the type of lands whose marginal costs are 
lower than the critical level move toward the critical level by overstating their costs. 
The key expected results with respect to increases in spatial variability under 
asymmetric information are as follows:  
First, under acreage targeting, in Figure 4.3-a-i, as spatial variability of costs 
increases holding benefit variability constant, more land in area P (relatively lower cost 
type than area Q) will be enrolled. This results in an increase of information rent for low 
cost types since the expected distances in costs between low cost types and the critical 
level (
* (| |) i E c c  ) increases. As a result, the magnitude of benefit loss induced by 
asymmetric information become greater as cost variability becomes greater. In Figure 
4.3-a-ii, the change in benefit variability does not affect the degree of asymmetric 
information, since land enrollment under acreage targeting depends only on costs, so that 
the degree of asymmetric information would not change in response to the change in 
benefit variability.  
Second, under BC ratio targeting, on the other hand, in Figure 4.3-b-i, an increase 
in cost variability holding benefit variability constant leads to some land enrollment from 
area P, which represents relatively lower cost area than area Q. This increases the 
information rent of low cost types as well because the expected distance in costs between 
low cost types and the critical level (
* (| |) ii E c c  ) increases. Therefore, as cost variability 121 
changes from low to high, the magnitude of benefit loss associated with asymmetric 
information becomes larger. In Figure 4.3-b-ii, an increase in benefit variability holding 
cost variability constant results in some enrollment from area P, which represents 
relatively higher benefit area than area Q and R. As the benefit variability increases, the 
critical level of cost per acre (
*
i c ) increases, which results in an increase of the expected 
distances in costs between low cost types and the critical level (
* (| |) ii E c c  ), and thus 
information rent increases. Thus greater benefit variability might lead to a greater amount 
of benefit loss under asymmetric information.    
2) Effect of correlations  
Figure 4.4 shows how spatial correlation between costs and benefits affects the degree of 
loss of benefits. The shaded area and the dotted area, respectively, represent negative and 
positive correlation between costs and benefits. Again, I assume 50% of land enrollment 
in the program given targeting strategies under perfect information. Area P represents 
relatively low cost and high benefit types, and area R represents relatively low cost and 
low benefit types.  
Under perfect information, higher benefits can be achieved with negative 
correlation because the lands in area P are enrolled, whereas they are not enrolled with 
positive correlation. However, if the landowners with costs below the critical level 
overstate their costs under asymmetric information, then the key expected results are as 
follows:  122 
First, under acreage targeting in Figure 4.4-a, the level of enrollment would not be 
affected by the correlation between costs and benefits. However, the benefit losses caused 
by asymmetric information are greater with negative correlation than with positive 
correlation, because relatively high benefit types (area P) would be bid out from the 
incentive program with negative correlation. Nevertheless, total expected benefit with 
negative correlation under asymmetric information is still greater than that with positive 
correlation, because relatively higher benefit types (given the same cost level) are 
enrolled first with negative correlation.   
Second, under BC ratio targeting in Figure 4.4-b, the benefit losses caused by 
asymmetric information with negative correlation are greater than that with positive 
correlation, because lands in area P have greater information rent than lands in area R and 
S. In this case, the total benefit achieved is greater with negative correlation than with 
positive correlation under perfect information. However, this result may be reversed 
under asymmetric for a large enough budget and high enough degree of asymmetric 
information, because information rent of relatively low cost and high benefit types (area 
P) given negative correlation is greater than that of area S and R, which results in greater 
benefit losses with negative correlation than positive correlation.  
Third, in comparing the two targeting criteria, it is clear that under perfect 
information BC ratio targeting is the optimal targeting relative to acreage targeting. 
However, under asymmetric information, if costs and benefits are negatively correlated, 
the information rent in area P under BC ratio targeting is greater than that under acreage 
targeting. This implies that larger benefit losses may occur with BC ratio targeting than 123 
with acreage targeting because of asymmetric information. This problem becomes more 
severe as the budget and the degree of asymmetric information increase, and thus if they 
are large enough BC ratio targeting may no longer be the optimal targeting strategy.          
However, this graphical analysis does not allow us to see how much the loss of 
benefits in the presence of asymmetric problem would be, and it is also intractable to 
analytically examine the effects of spatial variability and correlation (Babcock et al. 
1997). Thus, in the next section I conduct a numerical analysis to examine how large the 
benefit losses associated with asymmetric information would be under different targeting 
strategies and different level of spatial variability of costs and benefits and correlation 
between them.   
 
4.3. Numerical Analysis of Carbon Benefit Losses under Asymmetric Information  
In this section, I conduct a numerical analysis to show how much the variability of costs 
and benefits and their correlation affect the magnitude of benefit loss under asymmetric 
information with different targeting strategies.   
The procedure to conduct the numerical analysis is as follows: i) specify marginal 
density functions for benefit and cost with different degrees of spatial variability, ii) 
randomly draw 50,000 combinations of benefits and costs normalized
50 between 0 and 1 
using a Copula function
51 with three different sets of Spearman’s rank correlations
52 ρ, 
                                                 
 
50 Costs and benefits are normalized between 0 and 1, because it is convenient to interpret them as 
proportions (Babcock et al. 1996, 1997).    
51 The Copula is a kind of distribution function which describes dependence structures among random 
variables. It allows us to specify a joint distribution with given marginal distributions (Trivedi and 124 
where ρ = 0.5, 0, and 0.5, iii) rank the benefit and cost combinations according to costs 
(c) for acreage targeting and according to the ratio of benefits and cost (λ) for BC ratio 
targeting, iv) calculate total benefits under perfect information given different budget 
levels and obtain the critical level of costs (c
*) and the ratio of benefit and costs (λ
*) for 
each targeting strategy, and v) calculate total benefits achieved and benefit losses under 
asymmetric information given different budget levels and different degrees of 
asymmetric information (  = 0.5 and   =1).              
I use the beta distribution as a marginal distribution for benefits and costs because 
it provides flexibility to assume different degrees of spatial variability according to 
combinations of the parameters  and  , which is expressed as  ( , ) B .
53 According to 
Babcock et al. (1997),  (0.5,0.5) B ,  (2,2) B , and  (50,50) B  represent a high, medium, and 
low degree of spatial variability, respectively. Given three different degrees of spatial 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Zimmer, 2005). Among several different kinds of Copula function, we use the Gaussian Copula, which is 
the most commonly used copula function, to construct a bivariate distribution of benefits and costs. The 
Gaussian Copula with bivariate normal structure can be written as follow:  
11
12
22 ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 2 2
1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
2 1
( , , ) ( ( ), ( )) exp{ }
2(1 ) 2 (1 )
uu Ga v vv v
C u u u u dv dv


 
  
 

     
   . 
   where denotes  the  standard  univariate  normal  distribution, 
1   denotes  the  inverse  of  a  univariate 
normal distribution,  2  denotes bivariate normal distribution, and ρ denotes the correlation of u1 and u2.  
52 Spearman’s rank correlation is the linear correlation between two continuous distribution functions F1(X) 
and F2(Y), defined as  12 ( , ) ( ( ), ( )) X Y F X F Y   , which represents a measure of monotonic dependence 
between two random variables X and Y (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2005). 
53 Given randomly drawn combinations of benefits and costs from the copula function, I then obtain the 
value x, which is the inverse beta CDF for a given probability p and a given pair of parameters α and β. 
This can be written as follows:  
    
1( | , ) : ( | , ) x F p x F x a b p 
    , where 
11
0
1
( | , ) (1 )
( , )
x
p F x t t dt
B
 

     , and 
B(α,β) is the Beta function. Each element of the output x is the value whose cumulative probability under 
the beta CDF defined by the corresponding parameters in a and b is specified by the corresponding value 
in p (Mathworks 2012). 125 
variability, I calculate the benefits achieved and benefit losses because of asymmetric 
information with respect to three different sets of correlations ( ) and two different 
degrees of asymmetric information ( ), under two different targeting strategies. Tables 
4.1 through 4.4 show how spatial variability and correlation affect the amount of benefit 
achieved from an incentive policy given two different sizes of budget: a low level of 
budget covers less than 50% enrollment, and a high level of budget covers more than 50% 
enrollment.  
To clearly explain the findings from the numerical analysis, and to be consistent 
with the findings from the conceptual model in the previous section, I describe three sets 
of results: i) when cost variability changes from low to high for a given constant benefit 
variability with zero correlation ( 0   ), ii) when benefit variability changes from low to 
high for a given constant cost variability with zero correlation, and iii) when correlation 
changes from positive to negative given the same level of variability of costs and benefits.        
4.3.1. BC ratio targeting 
Table 4.1 shows the proportion of benefits achieved relative to the maximum available 
benefits under BC ratio targeting with perfect information. This proportion of maximum 
benefits achieved is shown for different cost-benefit variability and correlations.
54  The 
highest benefit is achieved with a combination of high cost and high benefit variability 
with negative correlation ( 0.5   ), while a combination of low cost and low benefit 
                                                 
 
54 Maximum total benefits can be achieved with 100% of land enrollment in the incentive program.   126 
variability with positive correlation ( 0.5   ) produces the lowest benefits. If cost 
variability increases when benefit variability stays the same and correlation is zero, the 
amount of benefit achieved from the incentive policy increases. For example, the benefits 
achieved under high cost variability (ranging from 40.4% to 46.1%) are greater than 
under low cost variability (ranging from 12.7% to 21.1%). This is because more 
relatively low cost types enroll under high cost variability than under low cost variability.  
If benefit variability increases when cost variability stays the same and correlation 
is zero, then more relatively high benefit types enroll given the same level of cost, thus 
the amount of benefit achieved becomes greater as well. For example, with a low budget 
the benefits achieved under high benefit variability (ranging from 12.7% to 40.4%) are 
greater than under low benefit variability (ranging from 21.1% to 46.1%).  
In terms of correlation, when benefit and cost variability is fixed, benefits are 
greater if benefits and costs are negatively correlated, because more low cost and high 
benefit types enroll than when there is positive correlation. However, the difference in 
benefits across correlations decreases as the variability of cost and benefit decreases. This 
implies that if spatial variability is low, the benefit difference associated with correlations 
between benefits and costs will not be as large. These results are consistent with the results 
from Babcock et al. (1997). 
Now suppose there is asymmetric information in costs. Table 4.2 shows total 
benefits achieved with BC ratio targeting under asymmetric information and benefit 
losses relative to the benefits under perfect information for different budget levels and 
degrees of asymmetric information.  127 
First, if cost variability changes from low to high when benefit variability is 
constant with zero correlation, the benefit achieved with high cost variability is still the 
highest if the budget is low and δ = 0.5. This is consistent with the perfect information 
scenario. However, this is not the case with a high budget and δ = 1. Here the highest 
benefit is achieved when cost variability is low, because the magnitudes of benefit loss 
with high cost variability are greater than with low cost variability. This is because more 
land with relatively low cost will be left out of the incentive program with high cost 
variability due to the greater information rent. Thus if the budget level and the degree of 
asymmetric information (δ) reach beyond a certain critical level, the benefit achieved 
under low cost variability becomes greater than that under high cost variability.  
Second, if benefit variability increases when cost variability stays the same with 
zero correlation, the benefit achieved from the policy increases as well. For example, 
total benefits achieved under high benefit variability range from 15.5% to 65.4%, which 
is greater than with low benefit variability (ranging from 11.3% to 53.8%). This is 
consistent with the case of perfect information, even if the benefit losses caused by 
asymmetric information are greater with high benefit variability than with low benefit 
variability because of relatively greater loss of high benefit type lands with high benefit 
variability.  
Third, in terms of correlation between costs and benefits, with perfect information 
the incentive program always yields larger benefits when there is negative correlation 
than with positive correlation. However, this result may be reversed with asymmetric 
information if the budget and degree of asymmetric information (δ) are sufficiently high. 128 
For example, with a low budget and δ=0.5, the highest benefit achieved with negative 
correlation (33.1%) is greater than that with positive correlation (24.2%), while with a 
high budget and δ=1, the highest benefit achieved with negative correlation (49.3%) is 
lower than that with positive correlation (52.8%). This can happen because information 
rents with negative correlation are greater than with positive correlation, and more lands 
with relatively low cost and high benefit types will be excluded out of the incentive 
program with negative correlation, which results in greater benefit losses. Thus, if the 
budget and degree of asymmetric information (δ) are sufficiently high, the benefit 
achieved with negative correlation is lower than that with positive correlation.  
A key finding in this section is that the condition which produces the highest 
benefit under perfect information may no longer hold under asymmetric information. 
This difference becomes more marked as variability and the degree of asymmetric 
information (δ) increases. Therefore, the policy maker’s ability to screen asymmetric 
information becomes more important if cost and benefit variability are high, particularly 
with negative correlation, which are the conditions causing high benefit losses because of 
higher information rent than other conditions under asymmetric information. However, if 
cost and benefit variability are low it would not be as important because the benefit losses 
under asymmetric information are not as severe regardless of the correlations. 
4.3.2. Acreage targeting  
Table 4.3 presents the proportion of maximum benefits achieved by the incentive 
program under acreage targeting with perfect information for different cost-benefit 
variability and correlations. The table shows that the highest benefit is achieved under a 129 
combination of high cost and high benefit variability with negative correlation 
( 0.5   ), while the lowest benefit is achieved under a combination of low cost and 
high benefit variability with positive correlation ( 0.5   ).When there is no correlation 
( 0   ), as cost variability changes from low to high leaving benefit variability 
unchanged, the benefit achieved from the incentive policy increases. However, the 
benefit is not affected when only benefit variability changes, because land enrollment 
under acreage targeting depends only on costs. The table also shows that benefits are 
always higher when there is a negative correlation between benefits and costs, regardless 
of spatial variability. If costs and benefits are negatively correlated, as benefit variability 
increases with constant cost variability, the benefit obtained from the policy increases, 
while it decreases with positive correlation.  
Suppose now there is asymmetric information. Table 4.4 shows total benefits 
achieved and benefit losses with acreage targeting under asymmetric information for 
different budget levels and degrees of asymmetric information.  
First, with zero correlation, an increase in cost variability with constant benefit 
variability, increases the benefit achieved when the budget is low and δ=0.5. This is 
consistent with the perfect information scenario, even if there are benefit losses because 
of asymmetric information. However, as the budget level and the degree of asymmetric 
information increase, the benefit achieved under high cost variability is lower than that 
under low cost variability, which is inconsistent with the finding under perfect 
information. For example, with a high budget and δ=1 with zero correlation, the benefits 
achieved with high cost variability (30%) are lower than those with low cost variability 130 
(49.4%). This is because the benefit losses associated with asymmetric information 
become more severe with high cost variability than with low cost variability, because the 
underlying intuition is that the greater information rent with high cost variability causes 
greater acreage loss of relatively low cost types.  
Second, under acreage targeting changes in benefit variability leaving cost 
variability fixed with zero correlation do not affect the benefit achieved from the policy. 
As shown in Table 4.4, the benefits achieved with zero correlation are the same across 
benefit variability, while they differ across cost variability.  
Third, in terms of correlation between benefits and costs, the benefits achieved 
with negative correlation (ranging from 12.3% to 67.3%) are always greater than that 
with positive correlation (ranging from 10.4% to 51.2%). This is consistent with the 
perfect information case, even if the benefit losses due to asymmetric information 
become greater as costs and benefits are negatively correlated. This is because, under 
acreage targeting, information rents are the same across correlations given the same cost 
variability and budget. Total acreages enrolled are the same, but relatively high benefit 
types enroll more with negative correlation than positive correlation within the same 
acreage of lands enrolled.  
An important finding is that for a small budget and a low degree of asymmetric 
information a combination of high cost and high benefit variability with negative 
correlation generates the highest benefits, but as the budget and the degree of asymmetric 
information increase, this is no longer the best performing combination, because of 
greater acreage losses of low cost and high benefit type lands with this combination than 131 
others. This is important because what we believe as an optimal condition is no longer 
optimal under asymmetric information. Thus, this combination requires that the policy 
maker have a greater ability to screen asymmetric information. However, if cost 
variability is low, the benefit losses induced by asymmetric information are small, so it 
does not much require the policy maker’s ability of screening.    
4.3.3. BC ratio targeting vs. acreage targeting 
Table 4.5 shows the performance of acreage targeting relative to BC ratio targeting. If the 
ratio of benefits from acreage targeting to the benefits from BC ratio targeting is more 
(less) than 1, the benefits achieved under acreage targeting are higher (lower) than under 
BC ratio targeting.   
Under perfect information BC ratio targeting produces greater benefits than 
acreage targeting as in Babcock et al. (1997). This result also holds under asymmetric 
information if cost variability is lower than benefit variability, or if the correlation 
between benefits and costs is zero ( 0   ) or positive ( 0.5   ), regardless of the budget 
or the degree of information asymmetry (ʴ). However, this result can be reversed, so that 
acreage targeting performs better than BC ratio targeting (the ratio is greater than 1), 
particularly when benefits and costs are negatively correlated. The reason is that the 
magnitude of benefit loss caused by asymmetric information under BC ratio targeting 
becomes greater than that under acreage targeting when benefits and costs are negatively 
correlated ( 0.5   ). The benefit loss can be even more severe with negative correlation, 
with a larger budget, a higher degree of information asymmetry (ʴ), and greater cost 
variability. As before, the reason is that the information rent of low cost and high benefit 132 
types under BC ratio targeting becomes greater than that under acreage targeting (see 
section 4.2.3-1). Thus, in the presence of asymmetric information, BC ratio targeting may 
no longer be the optimal targeting strategy. 
To summarize, a key finding is that if costs and benefits are negatively correlated, 
and if cost variability is greater than benefit variability, the benefit-ratio between acreage 
targeting and BC ratio targeting is very close to 1 under perfect information, and greater 
than 1 under asymmetric information, as shown in Table 4.5. Thus, while BC ratio 
targeting is the better option in most cases, under the conditions identified in this section, 
acreage targeting may be the better option. 
    
4.4. Empirical Application: Afforestation for Carbon Sequestration in the Pacific 
Northwest 
In this section, I apply the preceding analysis to examine how asymmetric information 
affects the outcomes of an incentive program for carbon sequestration through 
afforestation.  I rely on the results from the second essay to obtain marginal costs of 
sequestration and their spatial variability based on their statistical characteristics. Costs 
are normally distributed, truncated at zero with mean 121.068 and variance 59.895. 
However, since the data collected does not provide the marginal distribution of benefits, I 
specify the beta distribution as the marginal distribution for benefits, which corresponds 
to the three different degrees of spatial variability assumed in the previous section. The 
annual carbon sequestration rate per acre used as a measure of benefits in the PNW 
region ranges from 0.49 to 1.71 metric tons (Mt) per acre per year, which is estimated by 133 
using carbon yield tables from Smith et al. (2006) and assuming that stands are 
periodically harvested.  
Given this information on costs and benefits of a tree planting program for carbon 
sequestration, I draw 50,000 combinations of carbon benefits and costs for three different 
levels of benefit variability and three correlations between costs and benefits. Then I 
conduct a numerical analysis which estimates the carbon sequestration potential and 
carbon benefit loss in the presence of asymmetric information under two different 
incentive targeting schemes: BC ratio targeting and acreage targeting. I use budget levels 
ranging from $500 million to $2,500 million, which would cover around 20~80% of the 
total acreage enrollment for a tree planting program in the Pacific Northwest (PNW) 
region when there is no asymmetric information. The total area in the PNW that could be 
used for afforestation is assumed to be 31.2 million acres.
55 Finally, I derive carbon 
supply functions under asymmetric information and compare them with those under 
perfect information.   
4.4.1. Results of Numerical Analysis 
Table 4.6 and 4.7 show the total carbon benefits and loss of carbon in the PNW region for 
different levels of variability, correlations, and degrees of asymmetric information under 
two different targeting strategies. The trends of carbon benefits and benefit losses across 
benefit variability for different levels of budget and degrees of asymmetric information 
                                                 
 
55 The total available agricultural land area for the PNW region is determined based on Farms, Land in 
Farms, and Livestock Operations 2010 Summary released in 2011 by the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS), Agricultural Statistics Board, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The 
PNW region includes Oregon and Washington. 134 
shown in the tables are consistent with the conceptual numerical analysis conducted in 
the previous section.  
1) BC ratio targeting    
Table 4.6-a shows the results for BC ratio targeting under perfect information. The total 
annual carbon sequestration (benefits) from the incentive program range from 9.4 to 30.4 
million metric tons (MMt) for a budget ranging from $500 million to $2,500 million. 
Under asymmetric information, carbon sequestration ranges from 7.7 to 22.1 MMt at 
0.5   , and from 6.1 to 17.2 MMt at  1   . In Table 4.6-b, carbon benefit losses 
associated with asymmetric information range from 1.6 to 11.5 MMt, and from 3.1 to 18 
MMt at  0.5    and  1   , respectively. The magnitude of carbon benefit loss increases 
as benefit variability goes up, and is greater as the budget and degree of asymmetric 
information ( ) increase. This is consistent with the results from the previous section. As 
a result, for a large enough budget, the carbon sequestration potential with low benefit 
variability becomes greater than that with high benefit variability. This is shown in Figure 
4.5, where these switching points (dot circle area) are placed somewhere between 
$2,000~$2,500 million for 0.5   , and between $1,500~$2,000 million for 1    with 
zero correlation. This result indicates that if the budget level and the level of enrollment 
desired for the incentive program is less than the switching points, then more carbon 
sequestration is achieved with high benefit variability than with low benefit variability. 
This happens even if greater benefit losses occur with high benefit variability under 
asymmetric information.   135 
Table 4.6 also shows how carbon benefits change with the correlation between 
costs and benefits. For a given level of benefit variability, the carbon benefit losses with 
negative correlation range from 2.3 to 18 MMt, while losses with positive correlation 
range from 1.6 to 10.7 MMt. Hence, the carbon benefit loss with negative correlation is 
greater than that with positive correlation. As a result, the carbon benefits with positive 
correlation become higher than those with negative correlation at a budget between 
$2,000~$2,500 million when  0.5   , and between $1,000~$1,500 million when  1   . 
This result indicates that even if the magnitude of carbon loss in the presence of 
asymmetric information is greater with negative correlation, the carbon sequestration 
potential with negative correlation is still greater than that with positive correlation, if 
total costs are less than $1,500 million, which corresponds to around 35% of lands 
enrolled.       
An important conclusion that follows from these results is that a combination of 
high benefit variability and negative correlation, which leads to the highest benefit loss 
under asymmetric information, requires the policy maker to have a higher capability to 
monitor true costs in a tree planting program, while a combination of high benefit 
variability and positive correlation requires less monitoring capability. 
2) Acreage targeting 
Table 4.7 shows the results for acreage targeting. With perfect information, the total 
annual carbon benefits from the incentive program range from 8.1 to 29.3 million metric 
tons (MMt) given a budget between $500 million and $2,500 million. Under asymmetric 136 
information, benefits range from 6.2 to 20.8 MMt at  0.5   , and from 4.5 to 18.5 MMt 
at  1   .    
The amount of carbon benefit losses associated with asymmetric information 
ranges from 1.9 to 8.5 MMt, and from 3.6 to 10.8 MMt with  0.5    and  1   , 
respectively (Table 4.7-b). Under acreage targeting, enrollment in the tree planting 
program is not affected by changes in the variability of the carbon sequestration rate. 
Hence, if there is no correlation between costs and benefits, the carbon benefits achieved 
across different level of benefit variability remain the same. However, with negative 
correlation the largest amount of carbon sequestration is achieved with high benefit 
variability (ranges from 7.8 to 20.8 MMt), while with positive correlation, the most 
sequestration is achieved with low benefit variability (ranges from 5.9 to 18 MMt).  
Table 4.7 also shows that the carbon benefits achieved with negative correlation 
(ranging from 8.5 to 18.5 MMt) are consistently greater than those achieved with positive 
correlation (range from 6.2 to 15.5 MMt). As argued in the preceding section, this is 
because more lands with relatively higher carbon sequestration rate enroll for a given 
level of costs, even if some lands which would be enrolled under perfect information do 
not enroll when there is asymmetric information.  
Another important finding under acreage targeting is that the carbon benefits 
achieved with high benefit variability at a high degree of asymmetric information ( 1   ), 
which range from 7.9 to 18.5 MMt, are similar to those achieved with low benefit 
variability at low degree of asymmetric information ( 0   ), ranging from 7.9 to 18 MMt. 
This implies that the policy maker’s ability to monitor the true marginal cost in a tree 137 
planting program is less important with the combination of high benefit variability and 
negative correlation than with the combination of low benefit variability and positive 
correlation. 
3) BC ratio targeting vs. Acreage targeting 
A comparison of total carbon benefits between the two targeting tools for an afforestation 
program suggest that, in most cases, BC ratio targeting performs better than acreage 
targeting, with or without asymmetric information. In addition, the difference in carbon 
sequestration potential between the two targeting tools decreases as benefit variability 
changes from high to low. However, as shown in Figure 4.6, if benefits and costs are 
negatively correlated ( 0.5   ) and there is asymmetric information ( 0.5, or 1   ), 
then as the budget level increases, the carbon sequestration potential of acreage targeting 
becomes greater than that of BC ratio targeting. The reason behind this is that with 
negative correlation the information rent of low cost and high benefit lands is greater with 
BC ratio targeting than with acreage targeting.  
In conclusion, recognition of spatial characteristics of costs and benefits can be 
useful when a policy maker chooses a targeting strategy for an incentive program for 
carbon sequestration through afforestation. For example, if spatial variability is low, the 
difference in carbon sequestration between the two targeting strategies is small regardless 
of correlation, and thus the choice of targeting strategy may not as important. If spatial 
variability is high, and costs and benefits are negatively correlated, acreage targeting may 
be a better option than BC ratio targeting.     138 
4.4.2. Derivation of carbon supply functions 
Based on the results of the numerical analysis of carbon sequestration potential with 
various combinations of cost and benefit variability and correlations under both perfect 
and asymmetric information, I generate carbon supply functions corresponding to each 
combination of variability, correlation, and degree of asymmetric information. Since 
there are 27 different combinations in terms of variability, correlation (  ), and degree of 
asymmetric information ( ), to simplify I first derive three groups of supply functions 
for three different degrees of asymmetric information for each targeting tool. Within each 
group, I derive carbon supply functions with respect to different levels of correlations, as 
shown in Figure 4.7. It is clear that as the degree of asymmetric information increases, 
carbon supply functions shift up, and costs of carbon sequestration increase.  
Under BC ratio targeting with perfect information ( 0   ), as correlation changes 
from negative to positive, carbon supply functions shift up, so that cost of carbon 
sequestration increases. In the presence of asymmetric information, the cost of carbon 
sequestration is lower with negative correlations than with positive correlations, if annual 
carbon sequestration is less than 19~20 MMt at  0.5   , and 9.9~12 MMt at  1   , 
respectively (Figure 4.7-a). If annual carbon sequestration exceeds those amounts, carbon 
sequestration costs more with negative correlation than with positive correlation. On the 
other hand, under acreage targeting, within the same variability of costs and benefits, 
supply functions with negative correlation are always flatter than with positive 
correlation, so that the price of carbon with negative correlation is cheaper than that with 
positive correlation, even with asymmetric information (Figure 4.7-b).  139 
In Figure 4.8, I also derive carbon supply functions with respect to different levels 
of carbon benefit variability for a given cost variability derived from the econometric 
analysis. 
Under BC ratio targeting with perfect information ( 0   ), as carbon benefit 
variability changes from low to high, carbon supply functions shift down, and thus the 
cost of carbon sequestration decreases. With asymmetric information, if annual carbon 
sequestration is less than 19.4~21 MMt at  0.5   , and 12~14 MMt at  1   , 
respectively, carbon sequestration with high benefit variability costs less than with 
medium and low variability. If annual carbon sequestration increases more than that 
amount, the cost of carbon sequestration with respect to benefit variability will be 
reversed (Figure 4.8-a). Under acreage targeting, on the other hand, the difference in 
variability of carbon benefits does not change the carbon supply functions (Figure 4.8-b). 
A comparison of carbon supply functions derived from the two different targeting tools 
suggests that in most cases the cost of carbon under BC ratio targeting is cheaper than 
that under acreage targeting, but this can be reversed with high level of benefit variability 
and high degree of asymmetric information ( 1   ).  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
This study is motivated by concerns about the possibility of benefit loss from incentive 
programs for carbon sequestration in the presence of asymmetric information. I expect 
that the magnitude of benefit losses under asymmetric information will depend on the 
joint distribution of costs and benefits, specifically on their spatial variability and the 140 
correlation between them. I examine the basic intuition behind the effects on asymmetric 
information on BC ratio targeting and acreage targeting using a simple conceptual model. 
Then I use numerical analysis to examine how the spatial variability and correlation of 
costs and benefits affect the benefit loss under asymmetric information. Finally, I derive 
carbon supply functions for an afforestation program in the PNW region with various 
combinations of spatial variability and correlations for a given budget level.   
The main finding of this analysis is that a combination of high cost and high 
benefit variability with negative correlation, which is the combination that achieves the 
greatest benefit under perfect information, results in the greatest benefit loss under 
asymmetric information. This implies that the optimal targeting strategy under perfect 
information may not be preferred under asymmetric information. In particular, this is the 
case when the budget level and the degree of asymmetric information are high enough, so 
that under these conditions the policy maker’s ability to screen asymmetric information 
becomes more important. However, if cost and benefit variability are low the benefit loss 
under asymmetric information is not as severe, regardless of the correlations. In this case 
an optimal targeting strategy under perfect information is still optimal under asymmetric 
information, and thus it does not require highly accurate monitoring by the policy maker. 
Finally, I want to note that the measurement and monitoring costs for 
implementing incentive program are not included. If they are taken into account, the 
performance of BC ratio targeting relative to acreage targeting may become lower, and 
the switching point that acreage targeting become more efficient than BC ratio targeting 
may become lower as well.  141 
Despite of this limitation, an important contribution of this study is that, by 
incorporating asymmetric information issues into contract targeting strategies given 
spatially heterogeneous types of costs and benefits, it suggests how policy makers may 
choose the best targeting tool for a given level of budget in the presence of asymmetric 
information. A possible application of the insights derived in this study is that, in the 
presence of heterogeneous forest types, knowing the magnitude of benefit losses caused 
by asymmetric information may allow a policymaker to choose targeting strategies and 
the level of monitoring for a given budget level. This may help the policy maker 
minimize potential carbon benefit losses caused by asymmetric information. These 
results may apply to other environmental services as well.  
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4.7. Tables  
Table 4.1. Proportion of maximum benefit achieved under BC ratio targeting with perfect 
information 
 
Budget (M):  Low  High 
C-var  B-var  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5 
High 
High  0.584  0.461  0.333  0.941  0.875  0.770 
Medium  0.511  0.426  0.338  0.851  0.796  0.725 
Low  0.426  0.404  0.383  0.757  0.737  0.719 
Medium 
High  0.396  0.321  0.242  0.907  0.845  0.760 
Medium  0.336  0.278  0.216  0.800  0.745  0.675 
Low  0.261  0.244  0.228  0.691  0.671  0.652 
Low 
High  0.225  0.211  0.195  0.840  0.819  0.801 
Medium  0.194  0.180  0.166  0.711  0.690  0.671 
Low  0.134  0.127  0.119  0.569  0.556  0.540 
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Table 4.2. Proportions of benefit and benefit losses achieved under BC ratio targeting 
with asymmetric information 
      Total Benefits  Benefit Losses relative to perfect information 
     
 ʴ=0.5   ʴ=1   ʴ=0.5   ʴ=1 
Budget  C-var  B-var  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5 
Low 
High 
High  0.331  0.290  0.237  0.179  0.168  0.155  0.253  0.171  0.096  0.405  0.293  0.178 
Medium  0.294  0.265  0.230  0.160  0.152  0.143  0.217  0.160  0.108  0.350  0.273  0.194 
Low  0.258  0.250  0.242  0.145  0.143  0.140  0.169  0.154  0.141  0.281  0.261  0.243 
Medium 
High  0.310  0.261  0.208  0.231  0.204  0.175  0.087  0.060  0.034  0.165  0.116  0.066 
Medium  0.263  0.226  0.185  0.196  0.177  0.155  0.073  0.052  0.031  0.140  0.101  0.061 
Low  0.210  0.199  0.188  0.163  0.157  0.151  0.051  0.045  0.039  0.098  0.087  0.077 
Low 
High  0.216  0.202  0.189  0.206  0.194  0.183  0.010  0.008  0.006  0.020  0.016  0.012 
Medium  0.182  0.171  0.160  0.171  0.162  0.153  0.012  0.009  0.006  0.023  0.018  0.013 
Low  0.129  0.123  0.116  0.123  0.118  0.113  0.006  0.004  0.003  0.011  0.009  0.006 
High 
High 
High  0.446  0.562  0.607  0.414  0.415  0.464  0.495  0.312  0.163  0.527  0.460  0.306 
Medium  0.485  0.536  0.551  0.353  0.358  0.393  0.366  0.260  0.174  0.498  0.438  0.332 
Low  0.494  0.499  0.500  0.294  0.305  0.314  0.262  0.238  0.219  0.463  0.433  0.405 
Medium 
High  0.513  0.604  0.632  0.443  0.454  0.512  0.393  0.241  0.128  0.464  0.390  0.249 
Medium  0.552  0.568  0.566  0.393  0.421  0.463  0.248  0.177  0.109  0.407  0.324  0.212 
Low  0.538  0.535  0.531  0.399  0.408  0.417  0.154  0.137  0.121  0.292  0.263  0.236 
Low 
High  0.626  0.641  0.654  0.480  0.496  0.528  0.213  0.178  0.146  0.359  0.323  0.272 
Medium  0.591  0.590  0.589  0.481  0.495  0.510  0.120  0.101  0.083  0.229  0.195  0.162 
Low  0.531  0.525  0.518  0.493  0.495  0.497  0.039  0.031  0.021  0.077  0.061  0.042 
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Table 4.3. Proportions of maximum benefit achieved under acreage targeting with perfect 
information 
 
Budget (M):  Low  High 
C-var  B-var  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5 
High 
High  0.542  0.402  0.268  0.849  0.734  0.624 
Medium  0.495  0.402  0.315  0.811  0.734  0.661 
Low  0.425  0.402  0.382  0.754  0.734  0.716 
Medium 
High  0.353  0.242  0.135  0.795  0.667  0.544 
Medium  0.315  0.242  0.172  0.752  0.667  0.587 
Low  0.259  0.242  0.226  0.689  0.667  0.649 
Low 
High  0.188  0.120  0.054  0.680  0.539  0.403 
Medium  0.165  0.120  0.076  0.631  0.539  0.451 
Low  0.130  0.120  0.110  0.560  0.539  0.520 
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Table 4.4. Proportions of total benefit and benefit losses achieved under acreage targeting 
with asymmetric information 
      Total Benefits  Benefit Losses relative to perfect information 
     
 ʴ=0.5   ʴ=1   ʴ=0.5   ʴ=1 
Budget  C-var  B-var  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5 
Low 
High 
High  0.361  0.249  0.140  0.220  0.141  0.067  0.181  0.154  0.128  0.322  0.261  0.201 
Medium  0.323  0.249  0.177  0.194  0.141  0.092  0.172  0.154  0.138  0.300  0.261  0.223 
Low  0.267  0.249  0.232  0.154  0.141  0.130  0.159  0.154  0.150  0.271  0.261  0.252 
Medium 
High  0.295  0.198  0.104  0.239  0.156  0.076  0.057  0.044  0.032  0.113  0.086  0.059 
Medium  0.263  0.198  0.135  0.211  0.156  0.102  0.052  0.044  0.037  0.104  0.086  0.070 
Low  0.213  0.198  0.183  0.169  0.156  0.143  0.046  0.044  0.043  0.091  0.086  0.083 
Low 
High  0.183  0.117  0.052  0.178  0.113  0.050  0.005  0.003  0.002  0.009  0.007  0.004 
Medium  0.161  0.117  0.073  0.157  0.113  0.071  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.008  0.007  0.005 
Low  0.127  0.117  0.107  0.123  0.113  0.104  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.007  0.007  0.006 
High 
High 
High  0.634  0.493  0.356  0.420  0.300  0.181  0.215  0.240  0.268  0.429  0.433  0.442 
Medium  0.585  0.493  0.404  0.378  0.300  0.223  0.226  0.240  0.257  0.433  0.433  0.439 
Low  0.514  0.493  0.474  0.316  0.300  0.283  0.240  0.240  0.243  0.438  0.433  0.434 
Medium 
High  0.673  0.532  0.395  0.544  0.407  0.273  0.122  0.136  0.148  0.251  0.261  0.271 
Medium  0.624  0.532  0.443  0.496  0.407  0.320  0.128  0.136  0.143  0.256  0.261  0.267 
Low  0.554  0.532  0.512  0.427  0.407  0.388  0.135  0.136  0.137  0.262  0.261  0.261 
Low 
High  0.658  0.517  0.380  0.636  0.494  0.358  0.022  0.022  0.023  0.044  0.045  0.046 
Medium  0.609  0.517  0.428  0.586  0.494  0.406  0.022  0.022  0.023  0.045  0.045  0.045 
Low  0.538  0.517  0.497  0.516  0.494  0.475  0.022  0.022  0.022  0.045  0.045  0.045 
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Table 4.5. Benefits ratio between BC ratio targeting and acreage targeting    
     
Perfect info. (ʴ=0)  Asymmetric info. (ʴ=0.5)  Asymmetric info. (ʴ=1) 
Budget C-var  B-var  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5 
Low 
High 
High  0.929  0.874  0.805  1.092  0.858  0.593  1.230  0.843  0.435 
Low  0.998  0.997  0.997  1.035  0.994  0.960  1.066  0.992  0.929 
Low 
High  0.832  0.570  0.278  0.849  0.577  0.276  0.866  0.584  0.276 
Low  0.970  0.943  0.926  0.985  0.950  0.922  1.001  0.956  0.918 
High 
High 
High  0.902  0.839  0.810  1.421  0.878  0.586  1.014  0.724  0.391 
Low  0.997  0.995  0.996  1.039  0.989  0.946  1.076  0.984  0.899 
Low 
High  0.810  0.658  0.504  1.051  0.807  0.581  1.323  0.997  0.677 
Low  0.984  0.970  0.963  1.013  0.984  0.959  1.046  1.000  0.955 
Note: The ratio less (more) than 1 implies the benefits achieved under acreage targeting is less (more) than 
that under BC ratio targeting.  
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Table 4.6. Total carbon sequestration and loss of carbon by spatial variability and 
correlation in PNW region under BC ratio targeting 
 
B variability::  High  Medium  Low 
Correlation:  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5 
Budget  
($ million) 
a.  Total carbon sequestration, MMt 
Perfect Info. $500  13.405  11.496  9.422  12.187  10.830  9.357  10.725  10.357  10.009 
$1500  24.221  22.220  19.822  22.417  21.016  19.319  20.578  20.191  19.797 
$2500  30.355  29.347  27.661  29.153  28.240  26.990  27.740  27.457  27.168 
Asymmetric 
info., ʴ=0.5 
$500  10.248  9.129  7.843  9.343  8.570  7.668  8.392  8.193  7.978 
$1500  17.554  17.335  16.493  16.937  16.606  15.996  16.252  16.130  16.001 
$2500  18.888  20.775  22.133  20.594  21.426  21.900  21.385  21.485  21.559 
Asymmetric 
info., ʴ=1 
$500  7.373  6.909  6.324  6.745  6.457  6.054  6.223  6.160  6.065 
$1500  12.057  12.921  13.320  12.108  12.551  12.828  12.254  12.341  12.426 
$2500  12.210  14.380  17.127  13.854  15.523  17.177  15.726  16.086  16.426 
b.  Loss of carbon benefit relative to perfect information, MMt 
Asymmetric 
info., ʴ=0.5 
$500  3.157  2.368  1.579  2.844  2.260  1.689  2.333  2.164  2.031 
$1500  6.667  4.885  3.329  5.480  4.410  3.323  4.326  4.061  3.796 
$2500  11.466  8.572  5.528  8.559  6.814  5.090  6.355  5.972  5.609 
Asymmetric 
info., ʴ=1 
$500  6.032  4.587  3.098  5.441  4.373  3.302  4.502  4.196  3.944 
$1500  12.164  9.299  6.502  10.309  8.465  6.491  8.324  7.850  7.371 
$2500  17.965  14.967  10.534  15.299  12.717  9.813  12.014  11.371  10.742 
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Table 4.7. Total Benefit by spatial variability and correlation in PNW region under 
Acreage targeting 
 
B variability:  High  Medium  Low 
Correlation:  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5  ρ=0  ρ=0.5 
Budget  
($ million) 
a.  Total carbon sequestration, MMt 
Perfect Info.  $500  12.615  10.312  8.057  11.854  10.312  8.843  10.707  10.312  9.987 
$1500  22.690  20.151  17.567  21.827  20.151  18.474  20.545  20.151  19.763 
$2500  29.253  27.423  25.584  28.646  27.423  26.216  27.711  27.423  27.135 
Asymmetric 
info., ʴ=0.5 
$500  10.144  8.140  6.168  9.481  8.140  6.854  8.470  8.140  7.870 
$1500  18.492  15.914  13.304  17.606  15.914  14.227  16.293  15.914  15.539 
$2500  20.834  18.361  15.836  19.983  18.361  16.725  18.719  18.361  17.989 
Asymmetric 
info., ʴ=1 
$500  7.758  6.111  4.449  7.214  6.111  5.028  6.369  6.111  5.894 
$1500  14.718  12.308  9.907  13.899  12.308  10.762  12.674  12.308  11.994 
$2500  18.486  15.916  13.305  17.600  15.916  14.228  16.287  15.916  15.540 
b.  Loss of carbon benefit relative to perfect information, MMt 
Asymmetric 
info., ʴ=0.5 
$500  2.471  2.172  1.889  2.373  2.172  1.988  2.237  2.172  2.117 
$1500  4.198  4.237  4.263  4.221  4.237  4.247  4.252  4.237  4.223 
$2500  8.419  9.062  9.748  8.663  9.062  9.491  8.992  9.062  9.146 
Asymmetric 
info., ʴ=1 
$500  4.857  4.201  3.607  4.640  4.201  3.815  4.338  4.201  4.093 
$1500  7.973  7.843  7.660  7.928  7.843  7.712  7.871  7.843  7.768 
$2500  10.767  11.507  12.279  11.046  11.507  11.987  11.424  11.507  11.595 
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4.8. Figures 
Figure 4.1. Forestland types in Cost-benefit relationship 
 
Source: Babcock et al. (1997) 
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Figure 4.2. Changes in costs under asymmetric information with different targeting 
schemes 
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Figure 4.3. Expected effects of variability on degree of asymmetric information and 
benefit losses    
 
Note:   i) Arrows in the figures represent the direction of the low cost types move toward the critical level 
of cost. 
  ii) Under BC ratio targeting, 
** (1 ) ii cb      
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Figure 4.4. Effect of correlation on degree of asymmetric information and benefit losses 
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Figure 4.5. Total carbon benefits with respect to the benefit variability under BC ratio 
targeting 
 
   156 
Figure 4.6. Comparison of carbon sequestration potential between BC ratio targeting and 
acreage targeting with negative correlation ( 0.5   )   
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Figure 4.7. Carbon supply functions with combinations of correlations and degree of 
asymmetric information   
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Figure 4.8. Carbon supply functions with respect to benefit variability under different 
targeting schemes  
 
Note: Under acreage targeting with zero correlation, carbon supply functions are the same across benefit 
variability. 
   159 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adams, D.M., R.J. Alig, B.A. McCarl, J.M. Callaway, and S.M. Winnett. 1999 
“Minimum Cost Strategies for Sequestering Carbon in Forests.” Land Economics 
75: 360–374. 
Alig, R.J. 2003. “U.S. Landowner Behavior, Land Use and Land Cover Changes, and 
Climate Change Mitigation.” Silva Fennica 37 (4): 511–527. 
Alig, R.J.  2010.  Economic modeling of effects of climate change on the forest sector and 
mitigation options: a compendium of briefing papers.  Gen. Tech. Rep. PNW-
GTR-833. Portland, OR: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific 
Northwest Research Station. 
Antle, J. M. and Sian Mooney. 2002. “Designing Efficient Policies for Agricultural Soil 
Carbon Sequestration.” Agriculture Practices and Policies for Carbon 
Sequestration in Soil. Ed. J. Kimble, R. Lal, and R. Follett. Boca Raton; London; 
New York: Lewis Publishers. 
Antle, John, Susan Capalbo, Sian Mooney, Edward Elliott, and Keith Paustian. 2003. 
“Spatial heterogeneity, contract design, and the efficiency of carbon sequestration 
policies for agriculture.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
46 (2): 231–250. 
Avery, T.E. and H.E. Hurkhart, 2002, Forest Measurements, 5th ed. McGraw-Hill.  
Babcock, Bruce A., P. G. Lakshminarayan, JunJie Wu, and David Zilberman. 1996. “The 
Economics of a Public Fund for Environmental Amenities: A Study of CRP 
Contracts.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78: 961–971.  
Babcock, Bruce A., P.G. Lakshminarayan, JunJie Wu, and David Zilberman. 1997. 
“Targeting Tools for the Purchase of Environmental Amenities.” Land Economics 
73 (3): 325–339. 
Beach, R.H., S.K. Pattanayak, J.C. Yang, B.C. Murray, and R.C. Abt. 2005. 
“Econometric Studies of Non-Industrial Private Forest Management: A Review 
and Synthesis.” Forest Policy and Economics 7 (3): 261–281. 
Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont. 2005. Contract Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press. 160 
Brand, D. 1998. “Opportunities Generated by the Kyoto Protocol in the Forest Sector.” 
Commonwealth Forestry Review 77: 164–169.  
Cho, S.H., D.H. Newman, and J.M. Bowker. 2005. “Measuring rural homeowners’ 
willingness to pay for land conservation easements.” Forest Policy and 
Economics 7: 757–770. 
Daigneault, A.J., M. Miranda, and B. Sohngen. 2010. “Optimal Forest Management with 
Carbon Sequestration Credits and Endogenous Fire Risk.” Land Economics 86 
(1): 155–172. 
Dennis, Donald F. 1989. “An Economic Analysis of Harvest Behavior: Integrating Forest 
and Ownership Characteristics.” Forest Science 34 (4): 1088–1104. 
Englin, J., and J.M. Callaway. 1993. “Global Climate Change and Optimal Forest 
Management.” Natural Resource Modeling 7: 191–202.  
Ervin, C.A., and D.E. Ervin. 1982. “Factors affecting the use of soil conservation 
practices: Hypotheses, evidence, and policy implications.” Land Economics 58 
(3): 277–292. 
Ferraro, P.J. 2008. “Asymmetric Information and Contract Design for Payments for 
Environmental Services.” Ecological Economics 65: 810–821. 
Gorte, R.W. 2009. Carbon Sequestration in Forests. CRS.  
Gorte, R.W. 2009. U.S. Tree Planting for Carbon Sequestration. CRS.  
Greene, W.H. 2008. Econometric Analysis, 6
th ed. Prentice Hall.  
Greene, W.H. 2009. “Discrete choice modeling.” In: T.C. Mills and K. Patterson, Eds. 
Palgrave Handbook of Econometrics 2: 473–556. 
Gregory, S. Amacher, M. Christine Conway, Jay Sullivan, and S. Amacher Gregory. 
2003. “Econometric Analyses of Nonindustrial Forest Landowners: Is There 
Anything Left to Study?” Journal of Forest Economics 9 (2): 137–164. 
Heckman, J. 1979. “Sample selection bias as a specification error.” Econometrica 47 (1): 
153–161.   161 
Hardie, I.W., and P.J. Parks. 1996. “Program Enrollment and Acreage Response to 
Reforestation Cost-Sharing Programs.” Land Economics 72: 248–260. 
IPCC. 2000. Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry, R.T. Watson 
et al. (eds.), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Johnson Renée. 2009. Climate Change: The Role of the U.S. Agriculture Sector. CRS. 
Langpap, C. 2006. Conservation of Endangered Species: Can Incentives Work for Private 
Landowners? Ecological Economics 57 (4): 558–572. 
Law, Beverly Elizabeth, and Mark E. Harmon. 2011. "Forest sector carbon management, 
measurement and verification, and discussion of policy related to climate change." 
Carbon Management 2 (1): 73–84. 
Lewandrowski, J., M. Peters, C. Jones, R. House, M. Sperow, M. Eve, and K. Paustian. 
2004. Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector. 
Technical Bulletin Number 1909. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 
Lubowski, R.N., A.J. Plantinga, and R.N. Stavins. 2006. “Land-Use Change and Carbon 
Sinks: Econometric Estimation of the Carbon Sequestration Supply Function.” 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51 (2): 135–152.  
Maddala, G. S. 1993. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, 
Econometric Society Monographs. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mason, Charles F. and A.J. Plantinga. 2011. “Contracting for Impure Public Goods: 
Carbon Offsets and Additionality. NBER Working Paper No. w16963.  
McDonald, J.F., and R.A. Moffitt. 1980. “The use of Tobit analysis.” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 62: 318–321. 
McFadden, Daniel. 1974. “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior.” 
In Zarembka, Paul ed. Frontiers in Econometrics, New York: Academic Press. 
McFadden, D., 1994. “Contingent valuation and social choice.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 76: 689–708. 162 
Murray, B.C., B. Sohngen, and M. Ross. 2007. “Economic Consequences of 
Consideration of Permanence, Leakage and Additionality for Soil Carbon 
Sequestration Projects.” Climatic Change 80 (1-2): 127–143. 
Nagubadi, V., K. McNamara, W. Hoover, and W. Mills, Jr. 1996. “Program participation 
behavior of nonindustrial forest landowners: a probit analysis.” J. Ag. Appl. Econ. 
28: 323–336. 
Newell, R. G., and R. N. Stavins. 2000. “Climate Change and Forest Sinks: Factors 
Affecting the Costs of Carbon Sequestration.” Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 40 (3):  211–235. 
Parks, P.J., and I.W. Hardie. 1995. “Least-Cost Carbon Reserves: Cost-Effective 
Subsidies to Convert Marginal Agricultural Land to Forests.” Land Economics 
71: 122–136. 
Pattanayak, Subhrendu K., Brian C. Murray, and Robert C. Abt. 2002. “How joint is joint 
forest production? An econometric analysis of timber supply conditional on 
endogenous amenity values.” Forest Science 48 (3): 479–491. 
Richards K.R., and C. Stokes. 2004. “A Review of Forest Carbon Sequestration Cost 
Studies: A Dozen Years of Research.” Climatic Change 68: 1–48.  
Salanié, B. 2005. The Economics of Contracts – A Primer.  Second edition. Cambridge, 
MIT Press.  
Salant, P., and D.A. Dillman. 1994. How to conduct your own survey. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
Shaikh, S. L., L. Sun, and G.C. van Kooten. 2007. “Are Agricultural Values a Reliable 
Guide in Determining Landowners' Decisions to Create Forest Carbon Sinks?” 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 55 (1): 97–114. 
Sheriff, G. 2009. “Implementing Second-Best Environmental Policy Under Adverse 
Selection.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 57 (2): 253–
268. 
Siikamaki, J., and D.F. Layton. 2007. “Potential Cost-Effectiveness of Incentive Payment 
Programs for the Protection of Non-Industrial Private Forests.” Land Economics 
83 (4): 539–560.  163 
Sigelman, L., and L. Zeng. 1999. “Analyzing censored and sample selected data with 
Tobit and Heckit models.” Political Analysis 8: 167–182. 
Stavins, R.N., and K.R. Richards. 2005. The Cost of U.S. forest-based Carbon 
Sequestration. Pew Center on Global Climate Change.  
US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), Office of Atmospheric Programs. 2005. 
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Potential in U.S. forestry and Agriculture, EPA 430-
R-05-006, Washington, DC.  
van Kooten, C.G., C.S. Binkley, and G. Delcourt. 1995. “Effect of Carbon Taxes and 
Subsidies on Optimal Forest Rotation Age and Supply of Carbon Services.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77: 365–374.  
Wu, JunJie, and B.A. Babcock. 1996. Contract Design for the Purchase of Environmental 
Goods from Agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78 
(November): 935–945.  
Wu, JunJie, David Zilberman, and BA. Babcock. 2001. “Environmental and 
Distributional Effects of Conservation Targeting Strtegies.” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 41 (May): 333–350. 
 
 
 